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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition (abbreviated NBSAE or NBSX) was an 
expedition set for the Norwegian claimed sector, Dronning Maud Land, in Antarctica in the 
years 1949 to 1952. The expedition was planned for three years, with several delays, and was 
not ready until 1949. In November 1949 the vessel Norsel and its crew left Norway and headed 
south to the Antarctic. On February 11th 1950, the “Maudheim” wintering base was established 
on the Quar ice shelf at 71º 02,6' S. – 10º 55,5' W. Because of this, the expedition is also referred 
to as the Maudheim expedition. 
The expedition was conceived by the Swedish geologist Hans Wilhelmsson Ahlmann. After 
years of studying glaciers in the northern hemisphere, he wanted to investigate whether climatic 
fluctuations, similar to those he had observed in the Arctic, were also occurring in the Antarctic. 
His idea eventually resulted in a cooperative expedition between Norway, Sweden and Britain. 
Each nation was in charge of its respective science discipline: Norway was mainly responsible 
for meteorology and topographical surveys; Britain for geology; and Sweden for glaciology.1 
Botanical and oceanographical research was undertaken jointly.2 For Norway this was the first 
opportunity to show what the newly established Norwegian Polar Institute (March 1948) could 
accomplish, and at the same time, strengthen national claims and economic interests.3 With the 
Norwegian Polar Institute, under the leadership of Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, as the main organiser, 
the expedition plans excelled. In cooperation with the other participating nations’ Antarctic 
committees the scientific programme and dispatch-related issues were resolved. The personnel 
on the expedition hailed from Norway, Sweden and the British Commonwealth (United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia) and were led by the Norwegian John Giæver.4 During the two 
years of wintering, a large number of journeys and expeditions were undertaken resulting in a 
vast amount of data being obtained. The geological, glaciological, meteorological and 
topographical surveys greatly improved the understanding of the role of the Antarctic ice-sheet 
on regulating the world’s climate and the world sea levels.5  
                                                 
1 Claude Cowan, "Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition, 1949-1952." 25.04.2019. Scott Polar 
Research Institute, https://www.spri.cam.ac.uk/resources/expeditions/nbsx/ 
2 Statsarkivet i Tromsø, Arkiv fra NSIU og NP: Db 0199, 10B/16 Antarktis (Antarktiskomiteen, Norsk 
geografisk selskap, forberedelser mv.) 
3 Knut Einar Eriksen et al., Kald krig og internasjonalisering, 1949-1965, vol. B. 5 (Oslo: Universitetsforl., 
1997): 380 
4 A full list of crew members can be found in Appendix I 
5 Robert Marc Friedman, "Å spise kirsebær med de store" in Norsk polarhistorie: 2: Vitenskapene, ed. Einar-
Arne Drivenes, et al. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2004): 349-353 
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The expedition is often described as the first explicitly multinational expedition to the 
Antarctic and as a predecessor and role model for later expeditions to the Antarctic and Arctic. 
The logistical groundwork and scientific activities/programme – and their results –, provided 
valuable knowledge for later use. The international cooperation aspect is also highlighted as a 
model, and a reason for its success. The perceived view is that the Norwegian-British-Swedish 
Antarctic Expedition (from now NBSX) was an apolitical venture with international 
cooperation of specialised scientific important. Before and during the expedition it was 
highlighted that the expedition did not to have any political aims, but that furthering science 
and cooperation were its sole mission. Later published works have looked further into 
additional motives and the discrepancy in the perceived and the actual motives of the 
expedition. This master thesis will follow in this tradition and be a contribution to give a more 
nuanced picture of the motives present at the NBSX. 
 
 Research questions and narrowing 
The thesis’ main research objective is to study the Norwegian-British-Swedish Expedition 
(NBSX) and map the motives present  
• at the realisation of the expedition, 
• during the expedition,  
• after the return of the expedition, and  
• to provide a careful analysis of the changes in merited during and in between these three 
phases. 
 
The hypothesis is that the scientific motives were the driving forces in the realisation of the 
expedition, but that the large, and unrealised economic potential of Antarctica resulted in the 
presence of political interests. The escalation of the geopolitical situation in the Arctic and 
Antarctic forced politically and militarily motivated actions from all three participating 
countries in securing territorial interests. 
But during and after the expedition the political interest was waning, and the high costs of the 
operation did not make up for the potential gain from the scientific results, presence or the 
cooperation between the countries. 
 
The expedition was three-national. Thus, an analysis dealing with all three nations would be of 
great interest. Considering the task at hand I have chosen to narrow the scope of my thesis to 
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focus on the Norwegian perspective. The expedition was under Norwegian leadership and 
managed by the Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI), and by using the sources from the NPI 
archives it will bring insight to Norwegian polar politics at the formation of the newly founded 
NPI in combination with previous research on the topic. 
 
 Sources 
When answering my research question, I will draw upon literature and sources sorted into the 
following three categories:  
 
- Articles and minutes/correspondence about the expedition written by expedition 
members or involved committee members, and articles published for public interest, 
official statements, and news articles  
- Personal diaries, books and personal statements 
- Articles and literature that analyse the expedition in retrospect 
 
One of the challenges of the source material is the location of the archives in which it is stored 
as well of the state of digitalisation and its availability. The expedition archives are located in 
the three participating countries, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom. Although the main 
communication and correspondence were in English, part of the material is written in 
Norwegian and Swedish, creating a linguistic barrier for the non-Nordic reader. 
Most of the primary sources used are located in Norway and are collected from the archive at 
the regional state archive in Tromsø (Statsarkivet i Tromsø - SATø) which houses the old 
archives from the Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI) and Norges Svalbard- og 
Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU). With the NPI (and NSIU) being involved in the management and 
leadership of the expedition, the main correspondence (including the internal Norwegian 
communication) between the three countries is stored here.  
 
The Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI) holds the published scientific records from the expedition 
along with the expedition diaries and messaging books, several of the personal diaries and an 
extensive newspaper archive regarding polar affairs in its library. These sources give valuable 
insights into the everyday life at the base and the personal matters of the involved participants. 
Moreover, the newspaper articles show the perception of the expedition and how this interest 
is reflected nationally.  
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 Previous research  
Generally, this thesis will draw upon the work of others, whenever the political situation and 
the scientific climate during the conception of the expedition and the following period is 
portrayed. Recent works that deal with the expedition itself show that there is an interest in 
writing about the expedition, and that there are still elements around this topic not fully explored 
yet. This thesis and its approach will therefor contribute to elaborate on the driving motives of 
the expedition. 
 
Susan Barr has written the most thorough analysis of Norway as a polar nation seen through 
the history of the Norwegian Polar institute in Norway - a consistent polar nation?. Barr gives 
an extensive historiography of the NPI and its predecessors, looking at the early expeditions 
and explorations under De Norske Statsunderstøttede Spitsbergenekspedisjoner (The 
Norwegian State-Supported Spitsbergen Expeditions) and further to the Norges Svalbard- og 
Ishavsundersøkelser’s (NSIU) expeditions and organising in Svalbard. Describing the 
reorganisation of the NSIU and establishment of the NPI and the relocation of the institute to 
Tromsø. Although she only briefly covers the NBSX itself, Barr offers great insights into the 
political and scientific climate of Norway’s polar research milieu during the conception of the 
expedition, giving a detailed account of the issues of state support for the expedition, how this 
relationship changed alongside changes in the scientific agenda, as well as the fluctuations in 
geographic focus on which of the poles to operate in. She furthermore discusses how Norwegian 
polar interests and politics have progressed, both in the Arctic and the Antarctic, due to global 
impact and personal impact by the likes of Hans Wilhelmsson Ahlmann, Adolf Hoel, Anders 
Orvin, Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, and Tore Gjelsvik.6 
 
In Norsk Polarhistorie Robert Marc Friedman discusses the organisation of the new 
Norwegian Polar institute and how it was slated to become a prominent institute taking a leading 
role in European polar research as was necessary because of increased focus and activity in the 
Arctic and the Antarctic and its strategic roles in security and defence. Despite these plans, the 
NPI continued to suffer from understaffing and scarce resources. Here Friedman gives the first 
long elaboration around the political connotations of the NBSX and the aftermath. A topic that 
                                                 
6 Susan Barr, Norway, a Consistent Polar Nation?: Analysis of An Image Seen Through the History of the 
Norwegian Polar Institute (Oslo: The Fram Museum, 2010): 31 
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has been understated when reviewing the expedition. He also clarifies several aspects of the 
Norwegian participation in the NBSX.7  
 
The most extensive works written on the expedition and the period running up to it is found in 
Peder Roberts’ dissertation A frozen field of dreams: science, strategy, and the Antarctic in 
Norway, Sweden, and the British empire, 1912-1952 and in his book The European Antarctic: 
Science and Strategy in Scandinavia and the British Empire.8 Roberts shows the different 
Antarctic relations and operations of Norway, Sweden and Britain, and how they merged in the 
NBSX. When discussing their historical background regarding the continent, he displays the 
diverging paths undertaken to seek leadership in the Antarctic and highlights the role of science 
in the colonialization. 
Roberts devotes a whole chapter to the NBSX where he thoroughly examines the organisation 
of the NBSX and discusses Hans Wilhelmsson Ahlmann’s hand in the making of, both, the 
expedition and the new Norwegian Polar Institute. He furthermore elaborates on how the 
organisers of the NBSX emphasised its scientific programme and the international cooperation 
through science. For him, the expedition becomes an example of the kind of specialised and 
professionalised science that was prevalent in this period. Roberts shows that the expedition’s 
legacy is shaped and created not only by the deeds and scientific results, but also by how it is 
reviewed and written about. 9 
 
In Lisbeth Lewander’s article she discusses the possible and additional political motives 
behind the Swedish (and, to a lesser degree the Norwegian and British) participation in the 
NBSX. She problematises the view, that apolitical, international cooperation, the scientific 
programme, and the expedition’s outcome are still perceived as the primary legacy of the 
expedition. Instead, she highlights the political and military contexts of the expedition, such as 
foreign policy, security issues, and underlying sovereignty.10  
                                                 
7 Friedman, "Å spise kirsebær med de store" 
8 Peder Roberts, A Frozen Field of Dreams: Science, Strategy, and the Antarctic in Norway, Sweden, and the 
British Empire, 1912-1952 (Stanford, 2010), A dissertation submitted to the Department of History and the 
Committee on graduate studies of Stanford University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy; Peder Roberts, The European Antarctic: Science and Strategy in Scandinavia and the 
British Empire (New York, US: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)  
9 Roberts, The European Antarctic: Science and Strategy in Scandinavia and the British Empire: 117, 128 
10 Lisbeth Lewander, The Norwegian-British-Swedish Expedition (NBSX) to Antarctica 1949-52; science and 
security. Proceedings Of The 1st Scar Workshop On The History Of Antarctic Research, ed. Cornelia Lüdecke, 
vol. 560, Berichte Zur Polar- Und Meeresforschung (Bremerhaven: Alfred Wegener Institut Für 
Polarforschung, 2007): 123-141; Lisbeth Lewander, "Den norsk-brittisk-svenska expeditionens okända sidor 
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Sverker Sörlin has written about Hans Wilhelmsson Ahlmann’s personal life and struggles 
and how they affected his scientific career. Sörlin show how Ahlmann, throughout his career, 
devoted himself to science and diplomacy as a bridgebuilder between nations in a time where 
rivalry and conflict were prominent. Ahlmann’s significant take on the sciences with a 
theoretical and methodical approach brought a specialization of science to the field. This gives 
valuable insight into the man whose vision and hard work resulted in the NBSX, and how he 
used his diplomatic skills and his hand in the making of the NPI. 
 
Viewing the articles of Hans Wilhelmson Ahlmann on the plans and scientific programme of 
the NBSX gives insight into the ideas that were the basis for the expedition, and show the 
motives present and which were promoted.  
 
The official account from the NBSX, The White Desert: The Official Account of the Norwegian-
British-Swedish Antarctic Expedition11, written by John Giæver and with contributions by 
Gordon de Q. Robin, E.F. Roots and Valter Schytt to the field trips and science chapters, tells 
the story of the expedition with the hindsight of sale to the public. Depicting the expedition 
from the start to the every-day-life on the ice. 
 
Later accounts from participants like Gösta H. Liljequist where he writes about the NBSX in 
both Sweden and Antarctica and in High latitudes: a history of Swedish polar travels and 
research12 and Charles Swithinbank in his story 50 years after the expedition in Foothold on 
Antarctica: the first international expedition (1949-1952): through the eyes of its youngest 
member one can make the connection with the legacy that follows the expedition to this day. 
  
                                                 
1949-1952," in Ymer, Polarår, ed. Gunhild Rosqvist and Sverker Sörlin (Stockholm: Svenska sällskapet för 
antropologi och geografi, 2009) 
11 John Schjelderup Giæver, Maudheim : to år i Antarktis: den norsk-britisk-svenske vitenskapelige ekspedisjon 
til Antarktis 1949-1952 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1952); John Schjelderup Giæver, The white desert: the official 
account of the Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic expedition (New York: E.P.Dutton & Co., 1955)  
12 Gösta H. Liljequist and The Swedish Research Secretariat, High Latitudes: A History of Swedish Polar 
Travels and Research (Stockholm: The Swedish Polar Research Secretariat in collaboration with Streiffert, 
1993): 499 
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 Method and theory 
By analysing the available sources and studying the actions and processes involved in the 
planning, the execution and the aftermath of the expedition, this thesis will reconstruct its 
motives throughout its existence.  
The source material used for this thesis are the three categories laid out in part 1.2 and repeated 
below: 
- Articles and minutes/correspondence about the expedition written by expedition 
members or involved committee members, and articles published for public interest, 
official statements, and news articles  
- Personal diaries, books and personal statements 
- Articles and literature that analyse the expedition in retrospect 
 
In the mapping of motives and their analysis, I will be using Ingemar Bohlin and Aant 
Elzinga’s methodological approach for studying polar research and describing the interests to 
invest in polar research. Bohlin & Elzinga marks the NBSX as the start of modern Antarctic 
research13 and by applying his "motive structure" to the expedition, I will make a motivational 
profile of the NBSX to map the different motives present.  
 
Bohlin & Elzinga uses the concept of motive to distinguish between the practical use 
and the symbolic value of science to show the close link between science and politics in polar 
research and how the funding of science differentiates two different types of value derived from 
scientific endeavours; 14 
 
1. The practical value of science – 
How science can input/supply military, economic or other knowledge 
2. The symbolic value of science – 
The value of science when recognised by others, which raises the esteem with which 
the institution is held in/ national esteem 
 
                                                 
13 Whereas the IGY 1957-58 marks the start of modern polar research in the Arctic.  
14 Ingemar Bohlin, Om polarforskning, vol. 167, Rapport (Göteborg: Institutionen för vetenskapsteori, 
Göteborgs universitet, 1991): 64; Ingrid Schild, "The Politics of International Collaboration in Polar 
Research," (University of Sussex, 1996): 40f 
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He establishes how these types of value are linked to the parameters for his "motive structure". 
Identified by six institutional motives; which are the driving forces of Arctic and Antarctic 
research; classified as one scientific "internalist" motive and five non-scientific "externalist" 
motives: 15  
 
1. Basic Research Motives –  
Driven by human curiosity, a research community, and /or an advantageous research 
area. 
2. Political Motives –  
Using science to mark national presence: Successful science programmes give 
international prestige and strengthen sovereignty claims. 
3. Economic Motives –  
A) Exploitation of natural resources such as marine and potential mineral resources  
B) Technological development: new equipment and science for exploitation of 3A  
4. Military Motives –  
Testing and developing new technologies and "freeze" training of personnel in "neutral" 
area 
5. Jurisdictional/Administrative Motives –  
Exercising jurisdictional functions demands a continuously updated knowledge base. 
6. Environmental Motive –  
Probing and monitoring for global changes in climate, and environmental protection.  
 
The Basic Research motive is "internalist"; i.e. it is driven by a group distanced from, and to a 
large extent not affected by, political, commercial, military and other "externalist" pressure. 
The non-scientific motives (Political, Economic, Military, Jurisdictional and Environmental) 
are "externalist", i.e. they are grounded in a quest for national prestige, economic gain, or 
power.16 All motives can act as driving forces in polar science, but they may vary in intensity. 
The motives are closely connected, and some may not appear without the other. The Political 
motive, for example, will only appear when other motives (e.g. the Economic and Basic 
motives) are already present, as an interaction with the other motives. The Environmental 
motive, on the other hand, is – at least in the short term – a contrast to the Economical motive. 
                                                 
15 Aant Elzinga, Changing Trends in Antarctic Research, vol. 3, Environment & Assessment (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1993): 7-27, Table on page 9; Bohlin, Om polarforskning, 167: 1-15 
16 Aant Elzinga and Ingemar Bohlin, "The Politics of Science in Polar Regions," Ambio 18, no. 1 (1989): 71 
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Yet, both motives are similar in seeking and utilizing scientific knowledge (albeit to different 
ends). 
What is more prominent in the Antarctic as opposed to Arctic polar research in the post-
war era is the trade-off between science and politics, where one is serving the interest of the 
other. With a much higher degree of autonomy in the Antarctic compared to the Arctic.17 
Science as an activity or presence, not for its scientific value, is supported by political 
institutions. Therefore, in executing their research, scientists become political actors 
performing a political and national task by advancing national interests. The symbolic value 
lies in the international recognition of science and makes it a buffer to the external pressure.18 
This is favourable for scientists: only when politicians don’t influence what type of science is 
carried out, science—with an internalist motive—influences politics.19  
Research of high-quality results in the highest symbolic value as it elicits credibility from 
other states. Hence political motives are applied to and facilitated by the Basic Research motive. 
This credibility has given Basic research a high focus. Science, as a symbolic instrument, is the 
mean to promote national interests in the Antarctic. This stands in stark contrast to the Arctic 
where science is used as practical effect or function. On the other hand, if the symbolic value 
of science is forced into a political frame, it will lose its political value. The symbolic value is 
only valuable when it is recognised and approved by others.20  
Therefore, it is exactly its internalist nature that enables science to influence politics. This 
is also where its vulnerability lies; when scientific impacts fail to put enough pressure on the 
political agendas, causing fluctuations in the development of science.21 
Politically initiated expeditions to Antarctica have been plentiful.22 Often, political 
conditions put strong geographical limits to areas in which scientific research was carried out, 
but not on the type of research itself. Although politically initiated expeditions often build the 
science around the political and national motives to justify their interests, in contrast to 
research-initiated expeditions where science lays the framework and the logistics of solving the 
scientific "problem" of interest, both are therefore inherently more similar than it might first 
appear. 
                                                 
17 Schild, "The Politics of International Collaboration in Polar Research,": 43 
18 Elzinga and Bohlin, "The Politics of Science in Polar Regions,"(1989): 71-76 
19 Uno Svedin and Britt Hägerhäll Aniansson, Society and the Environment: A Swedish Research Perspective, 
(Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands: Imprint: Springer, 1992): 278 
20 Pierre Bourdieu and Annick Prieur, Symbolsk makt: artikler i utvalg, En Pax-bok (Oslo: Pax, 1996): 45 
21 Schild, "The Politics of International Collaboration in Polar Research,": 33f 
22 Bohlin, Om polarforskning, 167: 88 
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Chapter 2: It all started with an idea 
 
 Historical retrospect  
Because their inhospitably and inaccessibility made their exploration difficult, the areas around 
the Arctic and the Antarctic were mostly unknown until recent times. In the Arctic early 
discoveries from the 16th and 17th century had led to the revelation of fertile hunting grounds 
and mineral deposits. Later, the exploration of the areas was connected with the hunt for 
resources and desires to explain the world and gain knowledge as part of the development in 
nation-building. The sciences were the fundament of establishing sovereignty, and therefore 
tied to political and economic interests. In the late 19th century, there was a race for the 
expansion of the European states to secure their commercial interests in the Arctic. Cartography 
and naming previously unnamed territories became valuable political instruments in the quest 
for sovereignty. These tendencies continued into the 20th century (and are also prominent on 
the NBSX). Even the scientists themselves worked by a scheme of claiming the land, first 
economically and culturally and, lastly politically.23 The polar sciences became important tools, 
both commercially and political, and thrived in this exploration period. In Norway, Adolf Hoel 
- the establisher and first leader of the NSIU - underlined the importance of science in his 
proposal from 1925 for the establishment of the NSIU.24 
 
Since the start of the 18th century, early explorers had set out to explore the polar regions in 
the southern hemisphere, but at the turn of the 20th century only a few areas around the great 
white continent were plotted on world maps. The area was regarded terra nullius, both 
politically and judicially. In 1895, Antarctic exploration was put in the spotlight at the 
International Geographical Congress meeting in London. With the technological advances, 
(improved vessels and engines, advances in hunting/fishing methods, improved meteorology 
and cartography), more expeditions were set for this area. Both privately funded expeditions, 
that were usually economically motivated and funded by seal hunters and whalers, and 
government financed exploration expeditions (science, political and economically motivated) 
existed. In the forthcoming decades, great advances in science and geography were made on 
the Antarctic continent and the commercial exploitation in the Southern Oceans rocketed. 
                                                 
23 Einar-Arne Drivenes, "Ishavsimperialisme," in Norsk polarhistorie: 2: Vitenskapene, ed. Einar-Arne Drivenes, 
et al. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2004): 199 
24 Ibid.: 203 
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Looking at the historical development in Antarctica, Odd Gunnar Skagestad draws a 
picture of three overlapping phases. These phases, along with their actors and motives are 
broadly reflected below. 25 The exploratory phase (1890-1905); marked the onset of exploration 
and was dominated by the activities of sealers and whalers, scientific expeditions and 
exploratory expeditions. This was followed by a nationalistic phase (1905-1949). It’s starting 
point is marked by the end of the Norway’s political union with Sweden. This phase is identified 
with the discovery of new areas and exploration, as well as, with the beginning of political 
engagement in the endeavour. While the phase was commenced by private commercial interest, 
governments showed political and national involvement in order to secure national interests, 
and further national prestige. The increase in whaling and the economic value it produced led 
to legal issues and issues of sovereignty. Great Britain was the first nation to claim a section of 
land in Antarctica in 1908; a start of an idea to include the whole Antarctic territory in the 
British Empire. Later, British claims were transferred to New Zealand and Australia. France 
made its own claim in 1924. Norway followed in 1927, 1931 and 1939. Thus, Antarctica had 
become “an additional site of European colonial rivalry”.26 The taxation on whaling had led to 
questions on sovereignty. With the annexations of land in the Antarctic, the economical motives 
were followed by a progression to secure military and scientific interests in the area. 
The third phase is described as the international phase (1949 –1959). The NBSX marks the 
start of the transition from nationalist rivalry to international coexistence, characterised by 
international cooperation and scientific exploration. This phase peaked with the International 
Geophysical Year in 1957-58 and I choose to end it with the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 
1959. The period marked the modernisation of polar research, and a shift from the large 
resource harvesting towards environmentalism. Science and international cooperation in 
Antarctica became a part of protecting the continent from fluctuations in the political climate.27 
 
 Norway, Britain and Sweden were all active in the early Antarctic exploration and had 
strong national traditions regarding polar exploration, which will be discussed in further detail 
below. 
                                                 
25 Odd Gunnar Skagestad, Norsk polarpolitikk : hovedtrekk og utviklingslinjer 1905-1974, vol. 4, New 
Territories in International Politics (Oslo: Dreyer, 1975): 13ff; Schild, "The Politics of International 
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The fundament of the sustained Norwegian presence, and thus, Norwegian polar 
politics, in Antarctica was funded in the first of Skagestad’s three phases.  28 Norwegian polar 
politics have arguably been characterised by a varying degree of consistency. Policies were 
often created ad hoc and case oriented, lacking institutionalised forethought and polar policy 
coherence.29 An often-discussed example of this is the curious lack of Norwegian government 
involvement in issues regarding Antarctic continent sovereignty,30 in the interwar years.31 This 
opened the arena for privately funded expeditions, often financially supported and encouraged 
by the whaling companies, to undertake scientific work.32 While several Norwegian expeditions 
had explored and mapped the areas around the mainland (in the Norvegia expeditions 1927-
31), no official claim had been made since Norway had claimed Bouvet Island in 1927 and 
Peter I Island in 1929. While Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen and Lützow-Holm planted the Norwegian 
flag at Enderby Land and annexed the land on the Norvegia expedition of 1929-3033, a statement 
from the Norwegian Prime minister Mowinckel in March 1935 later contradicted this claim and 
stated that the Norwegian Government had no intention to claim more land in Antarctica.34 
Although the Government had made an appeal to the British Government in 1934 to reveal its 
stand on a possible Norwegian claim in that sector of the continent, and received a positive 
reply.35 When other interested nations made their entries36 a demand for the Norwegian 
Government to act and secure national interests was made, both from political instances as the 
NSIU and commercial interests, underlining the economic importance of Norwegian whaling 
industry. When finally addressed in the Norwegian Government in 1939, matters urgently 
needed solving.37 A German expedition Schwabenland was on its way to Antarctica, with the 
intention to annex the region that is today known as Dronning Maud Land.38 The Norwegian 
government’s reaction addressed other states39, their activities and their potential threats upon 
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Norwegian whaling interests when the official claim of Dronning Maud Land was made on 
January the 14th in 1939. With the annexation of Dronning Maud Land, Norway recognised the 
Australian Antarctic Dependency and accepted a modus vivendi with the British. This marked 
the end of the long-lasting tension between the two countries regarding Antarctic polar politics 
and commercial interests.40 
 
Great Britain had up until the Second World War had hegemony in Antarctic polar politics.41 
Through the British claim of the Falkland Islands Dependencies (FID) including South Georgia, 
where Britain had exercised de facto sovereignty since 1833, the British could effectuate a 
jurisdictional administration over the Antarctic whaling industry, as the shore stations were 
located there. By issuing concessions, they controlled which companies could establish stations, 
and by charging licence fees for whaling (including fees for Norwegian whaling vessels) in 
British territorial waters they enforced their jurisdictional powers. Both the jurisdictional, the 
economic and commercial motives in regulating the waling industry were part of the reason for 
the formal annexation of the British Antarctic sector in 1908. In reality, this was rather an 
expansion of the FID to include the South Sandwich Islands and a sector of the Antarctic 
mainland.42  
The sensational endeavours of Shackleton and Scott had gained public interest for the 
Antarctic and their legacy brought national esteem. Their expeditions connected with Victorian 
and Edwardian British culture in showing drama, controversy and a quest for knowledge. 
Shackleton and Scott’s scientific undertakings increased the perceived value of polar science 
and laid the foundation for the Scott Polar Institute (SPRI) which was established in 1920. 
Quickly, the SPRI became a meeting ground for polar scientists and an institution that started 
the professionalization of polar travel and specialization of polar men.43 To increase control 
over British economy and the important natural resource industry – whaling – the British 
Colonial Office started the work on a state-financed whaling investigation programme in 1917. 
Whale oil was now of strategic value to the country, in the production of nitro-glycerine for the 
military and for oil in the margarine production. State interest was high, also in showing 
imperial authority within the FID.44 Meteorological data collected for weather forecasts were 
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crucial to the whalers and contributed to the economic growth. With the Investigations, science 
therefore became an instrument of politics, and the economic and commercial interests a matter 
for policy-making, underlining British sovereignty in the Antarctic through this, rather than the 
previous expeditions in the spirit of discovery.45  
With the entry of pelagic whaling in the mid 1920's the hunt for whales was moved from land 
stations to the high seas. This threatened the existing concession and licence system, and British 
sovereignty in the area. There were suggestions of expanding the jurisdictional powers to 
include the high seas and remain control of the whaling industry. But this was difficult, as it 
could provoke an Argentinian reaction and there were ongoing discussions between Norway 
and Britain regarding the Exclusive Economical Zones (EEZ) in the Arctic.46 In addition, 
Britain favoured the sector principle which Norway rejected due to their loss of Greenland to 
Denmark to the same principle.47 The negotiations between Britain and Norway on the 
concessions both for the commercial value and for sovereign authority in the area were a 
delicate matter. With the rise in pelagic whaling, territorial control remained an important task. 
The Imperial Conference in 1926 extended the British claims in Antarctica for "their possible 
utilization for further developing exploration and scientific research".48 The focus was on 
exploration and scientific research and downplayed commercial interests. The focus was. 
Furthermore, placed on scientific activity, not so much on its results, to justify the underlying 
territorial motive. With the entry of other nations’ (e.g. Germany and Japan) interest in the 
region, whaling regulation was put on the international agenda in the 1930's, and rational 
management became the dominant mantra within British Antarctic policy. Science and research 
were utilized in the regulation of whaling and became of political significance in the struggle 
for keeping sovereignty.49 The decline in whaling in late 1930's, due to low oil prices, led to the 
continuing drop in Antarctic interest, both politically and publicly. The era of sensational feats 
was over, and there was a low public interest in Antarctic travel. There was a decrease in British 
Antarctic activity in the years leading up to the war. With its onset, the British reign in 
Antarctica ended.50 
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Sweden's polar interests and exploration were mainly focused in the Arctic, with Gerard 
De Greer, Lovén, Torell and Nordenskiöld. The Antarctic interest started with Adolf Erik 
Nordenskiöld’s plans for an Antarctic expedition in 1889. Although the envisioned exploration 
was not realised, the growing polar interest eventually brought Otto Nordenskjöld to lead a 
different scientific expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula (1901-04), exploring large parts of 
Graham Land. While the expedition was both successful and scientifically rewarding, almost 
another 50 years would pass until the next Swedish involvement in an Antarctic expedition. 
Though there were discussions of an Anglo-Swedish expedition to the Antarctic in 1912-14, 
which would have resulted in the first explicit international expedition to the continent, the idea 
never materialised into more than great plans and many meetings.51 According to the Swedish 
science historian Urban Wråkberg, this drop in Swedish polar exploration is also due to the 
break-up of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905 in which Sweden lost its geographical Arctic 
connection to the newly independent Norwegian state.52 In contrast to Norway and Great 
Britain, the Swedish polar scientists mainly hailed from university institutions. Due to a lack of 
funding for science and expeditions from a national hold, they had to rely on private funding 
and foundations, such as the Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation, which impeded their 
exploratory fervour.  
 
During and just after the Second World War, the Antarctic and the Southern Oceans region 
became an arena for military warfare and strategy.53 With the German entry in the pursuit of the 
natural resources in the Southern Oceans and the Antarctic the situation tightened. With the 
possibility of German submarines attacking allied fleets in the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, 
the United States turned their attention south. After the war, they launched several military 
operations to the continent.54 In the German presence that took place in the Southern Oceans 
the Norwegians were particularly affected when the Germans attacked whaling ships and 
stations to get a hold of the whale oil and resources.55  
In an escalation of political instability regarding the situation of Antarctica, Britain, 
Argentina, and Chile disputed each other's claims on the area around the Antarctic Peninsula. 
All three states sent military expeditions to the continent in the period 1943-48. Britain sent 
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secret military expeditions, from 1943 to 1946, in the Operation Tabarin—later continued by 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey56 (FIDS)—with the aim to strengthen British claims. 
The expeditions were launched under the pretence of patrolling as a countermeasure to German 
activity in the area. In in 194257 and 194358 , Argentina sent expeditions to Deception Island to 
protest the British presence and restore Argentine claims. On its part, Chile sent an expedition 
to enforce its territorial claims against British challenges into the Antarctic region in 1947 to 
1948. Finally, Argentina and Chile signed an agreement on legal protection and mutual defence 
of their territorial rights in Antarctica in 1948 further protecting and consolidating their claims 
against the UK.59 
After the Second World War, the United States showed their powers in the Antarctic by 
sending the largest military expedition in history (Operation High Jump) to the continent in 
1946. The fraught political situation in the Arctic had provoked the need for more knowledge 
on adapting technology and men to cold climate warfare, and the Antarctic was a less tense area 
for these trials.60 Already in 1939, as a response to the Norwegian claim of Dronning Maud 
Land, the US had stated that they did not recognise any of the territorial claims by other nations 
up to this point and reserved all rights to the area on behalf of American citizens.61 And already 
in 1947 the US launched their next military training expedition, Operation Windmill. 
Another dimension was the potential mineral resources in Antarctica, little was known 
about the distribution or extent of gold, silver, oil and coal, and the desirable uranium. Coal had 
been found on the peninsula, but not to an extent that would be of commercial and economic 
value. Uranium, a coveted resource for some countries, with large military and commercial 
interest at the time, fell into the media’s concern, as the lack of information fuelled the media’s 
interests and became a reoccurring topic. Neither Norway, nor Sweden had any state interest in 
exploiting it for the production of weapons whilst, in post-war Britain, the foreign policy was 
more focused in an aim to seek control of a natural resource pool to withstand potential outer 
threats, and in the case of Antarctica – keeping a potentially valuable corner of the empire or at 
least be a part of the controlling organ in the consideration of internationalization. Although the 
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search for uranium itself was politically more a potential encouragement than a necessity for 
action.62  
During this post-war era, there was a rising interest in issues concerning Antarctica due 
to the growing friction, its resources – marine and potential mineral resources – and questions 
of sovereignty. The onset of the Cold War caused the Antarctic situation to escalate to an arena 
of security concern. Various ideas of international govern and initiatives for the equal utilization 
of the Antarctic had been fruitlessly put forward since 1939. Government proposals in resolving 
the sovereign matters brought the newly established United Nations, and the possibility of 
governing under the UN, onto the scene. Other organisations (e.g. the Women’s International 
League for Peace and Freedom, the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace) and 
individuals (e.g. Member of the British parliament Lord Edward Shackleton, President of the 
American Polar Society Dr. Dana Coman) also contributed in the discussion regarding the 
future govern of the Antarctic continent.63 The issue of Antarctic govern raised several 
discussions in the US, set off by the intensified territorial dispute between their allies Britain, 
Argentina and Chile, and the increasing Soviet interest in the continent accompanied by a 
proposal of a new polar year from the Royal Society in South Africa. These political concerns 
led to a revision of US Antarctic policy and produced discussions about internationalism.64 In 
1948, the US put forward a suggestion of condominium govern under the United Nations (the 
Draft Agreement on Antarctica) with joint sovereignty between the eight engaged countries: 
the United States and the claimants: the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Australia, 
Norway65, Chile and Argentina. This was intended to exclude the involvement of other nations 
and prevent "external interference" (from the USSR and its "satellite states") in Antarctic 
matters.66 The matter was a paramount objective in both US and British interest. The proposal 
was met with scepticism and rejection from all claimants. Opposition and lack of approval also 
arrived from states not consulted (e.g. South Africa, Belgium, the USSR). Norway rejected the 
condominium and suggested working through existing relevant international bodies, with the 
forthcoming NBSX as an example. Britain - eager to find any solution that would keep the 
USSR out of the Antarctic - supported the idea of the NBSX as it was perceived as a symbol of 
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openness Britain could use to remain a closed group of stakeholders. While Norway viewed it 
as international cooperation for scientific knowledge, with Ahlmann seeking both the US and 
USSR for possible scientific cooperation.67 
 
In this post-war era all of the institutional motives Bohlin &Elzinga presents are occurring. The 
Basic research motive through the exploration in seeking knowledge of the area and its marine 
resources. Heavily reliant on, and in parts motivated by, the Economic motive due to whaling 
and the prospects of new marine and mineral resources. And when commercial interests forced 
political involvement when the competition for hunting grounds threatened the industry, the 
Political motive utilised the Basic research motive to assert the Jurisdictional motive through 
territorial claims and disputes. In the disputes over territorial claims the Military motive was 
omnipresent to substantiate the Jurisdictional motive. Lastly the Environmental motive through 
the scientific work undertaken for the negotiation of preservation of whales. 
 
This fraught political climate formed the background on which the NBSX was conceived and 
into which it was planned. 
 
 Ahlmann – the master mind 
Hans Jakob Konrad Wilhelmsson Ahlmann (1889-1974) was a Swedish geographer and, from 
1929 onward, a professor at Stockholms högskola68. Ahlmann had a strong interest in glaciology 
and was an active field worker. Through his marriage to Erica (Lillemor) Harloff, he became a 
part of the wealthy Bergen-family, which had connections to the local scientific elite and 
politicians.69 
During his field trips to study the glaciers in Norway in the 1920s, he was accompanied by 
Halvard Lange, who later became Foreign Minister70 in Norway. In 1931, Ahlmann initiated 
the first joint Swedish-Norwegian expedition to Svalbard’s Nordaustlandet and, in 1934, he 
conceived an expedition to Vest-Spitsbergen in collaboration with Harald Ulrik Sverdrup. Later 
expeditions in Iceland in 1936, in Greenland in 1939-40, and at Mount Kebnekaise in 1946 
supported his results on the fluctuation of glaciers and the occurring retreat of the glaciers in 
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the Arctic hemisphere. These findings led him to try and seek the causes and effects for this 
"climate improvement"71—as he described it from a Northerners point of view—although he 
underlined the possible negative effects elsewhere on earth. 72 
During the war, Ahlmann proceeded to plan his polar fieldwork. And in March 1943 Ahlmann 
first proposed his plans of an Arctic expedition to J. M. Wordie, president of the Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS) in London. A suggested expedition set for the "European sector" 
of the Arctic, with cooperation between Britain and the Nordic countries (including Denmark 
and Iceland, not just Sweden and Norway). This idea was also mentioned to Olaf Devik in the 
Norwegian government (exiled in London). This exclusive arrangement of cooperation 
appealed both the Norwegians and the Brits but failed to elicit a positive result.73  
After obtaining maps and aerial photographs74 of mountaintops in Dronning Maud Land taken 
by the Germans during the Schwabenland expedition in 1939, Ahlmann revised his plans in 
1944, this time it was set to the Antarctic, with the Wohlthat massif in Dronning Maud Land as 
the base for the expedition.75 An expedition to Antarctica would extend his glaciological work 
from the Arctic into the southern hemisphere. He originally planned it to Graham Land on the 
Antarctic Peninsula, as a continuation of Otto Nordenskjöld’s prior expedition in 1901-04. 
Whereas Nordenskjöld’s aborted plans for a new international cooperative in 1914, a new 
expedition was now set.76 With this move, Ahlmann sought to continue the Swedish polar 
tradition. In addition, he expected to attract and convince British collaboration, as the country 
was in territorial dispute with Argentina and Chile in this region.77 
When presenting his revised plans to the Royal Geographical Society, in September 1945, it 
accepted his plan for collaboration. The photos of the snow free mountains with interspersed 
glacier tongues showed the area to be an ideal territory for geological and glacial science. 78 
With the conviction that “to determine whether the contemporary climate changes are of 
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regional or universal character, it is of the utmost importance to study the glaciers in 
Antarctica”79, Ahlmann turned to Norway as a potential partner in collaboration in 1945.80 
 
Ahlmann was also meddling in other affairs of Norwegian and Swedish polar politics. After his 
return from Moscow in July 1945, where he had attended the 220th jubilee of the Russian 
Academy of Science in late June, Ahlmann continued where he'd left off, now even more 
dedicated in securing Norwegian and Swedish polar interests. With growing Soviet initiative 
on polar research and exploration, Ahlmann urged the need for a Swedish and Norwegian 
involvement on Arctic and Antarctic science.81 Ahlmann’s plan for Swedish polar research 
included Norway as a collaborator. He called the Soviet threat to Norwegian attention and 
argued for a strengthening of Norwegian polar activity, referring to its territorial interests. He 
agitated both privately and publicly to reinvest in the NSIU, a situation already put forward by 
Adolf Hoel before and during the war. In August 1945 Ahlmann held a meeting in Oslo with 
his old colleagues Birger Bergersen (professor in anatomy, politician and chair of the Whaling 
Association), Olaf Holtedahl (professor in geology at UiO) and Olaf Devik (geophysicist and 
expedition chief in the Ecclesiastical and Education Ministry) which formed a committee to 
work on the plans on the future of the NSIU.82 Ahlmann also met with Prime minister Einar 
Gerhardsen, who seemed very confused regarding Ahlmann's questions and referred him to 
Foreign minister Trygve Lie. Ahlmann met up with Lie at his house and discussed the necessity 
of an influential Norwegian polar institute to withstand the forthcoming threats. Lie was well 
aware of the tense situation regarding Svalbard and the Soviet Union after his own visit to 
Moskva in 1944 and saw the need for a strong Polar institute to assist the Norwegian 
government.83 Ahlmann continued his travels and met with the RGS in London in September 
1945 to present his Antarctic plans (where he received a positive reply as mentioned earlier). 
During his visit he learnt of the British discontent of the increasing US and Soviet activity in 
the Arctic and the escalating tension. Realising the upcoming threat, his fear was that the Nordic 
countries became side-lined in the Arctic.84 When he returned to Oslo in December, he was 
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briefed by Bergersen, Holtedahl and Devik of the slow processing in the Norwegian 
Government. Time was of an essence and Ahlmann reached out to top politicians and 
bureaucrats to expedite matters. He met with Hilmar Reksten (chairman of Store Norske 
Spitsbergen Kulkompani) who promised to push forward the case and Lars Evensen (Ministry 
of Commerce) who immediately recognised the need to act.85 They had several meetings and 
agreed that Reksten would comprise a report to underline the need for a new administrative 
organ in charge of both Arctic, and Antarctic interests, with the continuation of the NSIU under 
it. Ahlmann was in contact with Harald Ulrik Sverdrup and promoted his return to lead a new 
institute.86 Reksten's report was forwarded to the Ministry and Ahlmann left Norway convinced 
he had a network of allies to get the ball rolling. Other forces, however, favoured the NSIU 
continuing under the leadership of Anders Orvin, as it was currently run. With Ahlmann 
impatiently waiting in Sweden, the issue was deferred for several months.87  
When Ahlmann met up with his previous field assistant Lange - now Norway's new 
Foreign Minister - in Stockholm in April 1946, he was promised a swift decision from the 
Norwegian Government. Lange understood the necessity of scientific activity to support the 
Norwegian claims.88 In late May the same year, H.U. Sverdrup was offered the position as 
director of the new institute called the Polar Institute (see below for further details).89 Lange’s 
reassurance led Ahlmann to continue his plans for an Antarctic expedition and he contacted the 
RGS and met up with Lord Rennell and Commander Kirwan.90 Ahlmann also presented his 
plans to the Norwegian Geographical Society (NGS) and gave a detailed description of the 
scientific programme, what could be expected to be accomplished, and the value of this science. 
His wish was to promote knowledge and insight and he pointed out that his interests were purely 
scientific. He also underlined that the area in Dronning Maud Land was of exceptional interest 
for his research.91 The British agreed to the plans on the condition of a Norwegian participation 
and underlined the importance in strengthening the Norwegian claim in Dronning Maud Land.92 
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In Norway, the Norwegian Geographical Society took the responsibility for the preparation for 
the expedition, while the RGS and The Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) formed a 
committee in Britain. Unsurprisingly, Ahlmann formed and led the Swedish committee.  
The Norwegian Geographical Society formally invited Anders Orvin on behalf of the NSIU to 
participate in a meeting to discuss these plans of an Antarctic expedition in October 194693 after 
the Norwegian Ministry of Trade had granted the NGS and the expedition 625 000 NOK to buy 
a ship to use for scientific work in Antarctica. The Ministry wished for the NGS to continue the 
scientific preparations for the expedition and the NSIU to take care of all dispatch-related 
preparations connected to the NBSX. Originally the idea was a small expedition under the 
leadership of major general Riiser-Larsen (a polar aviator), with Ahlmann drafting a scientific 
programme for the expedition. Funding for the expedition cost were to be proposed later94 Due 
to unexpected problems in acquiring a ship and other delays, the start of the expedition was 
postponed. The newly founded Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI), with H.U. Sverdrup in charge 
took over the planning in March 1948. 
Ahlmann was well connected and cultivated his network for later use. Which he used 
both directly in his scientific work relying on assistants and help in the field and in a more 
discreet and tactical way when presenting his vision for the sciences. His passion for science as 
a mean of cooperation gave him a high-ranking position and prestige in Sweden. Sverker Sörlin 
points out in contrast to his Nordic colleagues Adolf Hoel (NSIU), H.U. Sverdrup (NPI) and 
Niels Nielsen (Danish Geological Institute), who were tied to their institutions and their national 
policy, the Swedish lack of national polar politics and a polar institution at the time, made it 
possible for Ahlmann to meddle with polar affairs in an unofficial manner, without any set 
boundaries. He played his role as a policy actor well, achieving his wish for a reinvestment and 
strengthening of the Nordic in the polar sciences.95 
As for the NBSX, his participation in the expedition was only in the preparation phase, 
and although he had expressed a wish to join the vessel for the second summer visit, his plans 
changed when he accepted the position of becoming the Swedish diplomat in Oslo in 1950.96 
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 The establishment of The Norwegian Polar Institute 
On September 20th in 1946 an official statement from the Ministry of Industry revealed the 
plans of a Norwegian Polar Institute (NPI) to be established January 1st in 1948, as an offshoot 
of the former Norges Svalbard- og Ishavsundersøkelser (NSIU), new visions and strategies 
were laid out. The new institute was expected to excel in two aspects: professionalisation and 
expansion.97 The Ministry of Industry stated as the prerequisite for sufficient funding, the 
institute was to do research on both poles and establish Norway’s role as a leading country on 
polar research, especially considering Norway's "actual, historical and national interests" in the 
polar areas.98 The Foreign Ministry expressed the plans of an expansion in scientific ventures 
in the Antarctic as a continuance of Norwegian defence politics.99 
A key piece of the puzzle was to place professor Harald Ulrik Sverdrup (1888-1957) as the 
director of the new institute. Sverdrup was a world-renowned polar explorer and oceanographer 
who sought to continue the work on mapping and geology, as well as commencing geophysical 
surveys and climate research. Sverdrup’s international merits would activate international 
recognition of the NPI. Sverdrup was aware of the rise in polar interest from other nations after 
the war. Although he knew that Norway would never be able to afford the same involvement 
as larger nations such as the US, the USSR, and Canada, he noted that by raising the quality of 
its work, Norway could maintain a high position within polar research. 100  
On the 14th of November 1947 the bill concerning the establishment of the NPI was presented 
to the Parliament by the Ministry of Industry, receiving its recommendation on December 10th. 
There had already been made arrangements with H.U. Sverdrup, who then was officially elected 
for the position on December 12th. As for the organisational structure of the NPI, this would be 
decided later, and as Susan Barr points out, it seemed more important to ensure H.U. Sverdrup's 
arrival and capture him in the Norwegian polar cause.101  
On his travel to Norway to begin his new position in the spring of 1948, H.U. Sverdrup visited 
several institutions interested in the Arctic and Antarctic in the US and Canada. He noted that 
all polar research was strongly military. This however also motivated scientific work, as all 
science, but especially meteorology, would be of great military importance in case of a new 
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war. When arriving in Norway and starting his new position, H.U. Sverdrup envisaged copious 
funding and an extension in the activities and an increase in positions with the new institute. 
But the funds from the Ministry of Finance were scant due to the post-war economic 
circumstances. Already from the start, the institute lacked the resources to solve its assigned 
tasks.102 On H.U. Sverdrup's return, the NPI took over the responsibility of the NBSX and a 
fruitful cooperation with the participating countries.103  
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Chapter 3: And so it begins 
 
 The Antarctic committees – cooperation across borders 
While Chapter 2: covers the development in Antarctic politics, the initial idea for the expedition 
and the start of cooperation, this chapter will present the administrative structure to further 
illustrate the intricate bureaucratic situation in the three countries with regards to the planning 
of the expedition.  
 
Ahlmann's plans had matured during the war and as mentioned in the previous chapter he had 
been in contact with the Brits regarding his then, Arctic expedition plan, and further with Olaf 
Devik (member of the exiled Norwegian government) who had envisaged an approval after the 
war. When Ahlmann returned to Oslo after the war in 1945, he met with fellow scientists 
Bergersen, Holtedahl and Devik in August to discuss his revised plans for an international 
Antarctic expedition and ascertain support for Norwegian participation.104 During the war, Olaf 
Holtedahl had communicated with the polar veterans Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen and Helmer 
Hansen about further exploration of Dronning Maud Land. Addressing the Norwegian 
Geographic Society, in September 1945, Holtedahl expressed that he "hoped Norway would 
quickly resume its engagement with the polar regions".105 He furthermore stated that 
cooperation with the NGS would be beneficial, due to its history of connections to the previous 
nationalistic polar explorations (e.g. the Norvegia expeditions). These connections included the 
whaling pioneer Lars Christensen (the man who funded the Norvegia expeditions) in hope of 
receiving financing of an expedition. Holtedahl had little hope in regard to receiving state 
funding, as the post-war reconstruction costs were massive. In his traditional pre-war view, 
Holtedahl saw the nationalistic value of charting the Norwegian territories and was reluctant to 
include other nationalities, especially because cartography continued to be a political tool to 
express authority. Nonetheless, he remained a close ally to Ahlmann in his continued efforts to 
advocate Norwegian presence in polar exploration.106  
When Bergersen, Holtedahl and Devik met up with Ahlmann again in Oslo in December 1945, 
Ahlmann relayed the positive response from the RGS to them and was updated on the situation 
in Norway. Clearly upset with the handling of the Norwegian interests in the Arctic, or the lack 
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thereof, Ahlmann put his network of allies to work promoting a new polar institution while 
continuing to plan for his expedition to the Antarctic.107 In March 1946 Ahlmann left for London 
to discuss further with the Brits on including Norwegian in participating on the expedition. He 
met with Lord Rennell and Commander Kirwan from the RGS and representatives from the 
British Navy and Royal Air Force. The agreed upon area of exploration was Dronning Maud 
Land, as Britain wished to strengthen the Norwegian claim in the sector. After an official 
proposal and Norway’s acceptance, Britain would constitute a committee to coordinate the 
plans.108 Ahlmann returned to Norway and met with scientists, commander captain Lützow-
Holm (from the Norvegia expeditions 1927-31) and the Norwegian-American polar pilot Bernt 
Balchen.109 He also asked the NGS to launch an Antarctic Committee.110 This committee 
consisted of three members: Erling Christophersen (NGS President), the meteorologist Sverre 
Petterssen111 and Bernt Balchen.112 Further, Ahlmann met with Foreign Minister Lange, who 
agreed to the plans, and insisted on a Norwegian-led expedition, under Norwegian flag. Others 
(Bergersen, Holtedahl and Christophersen) favoured reducing British participation to a 
minimum, fearing that it could threaten Norwegian whaling prospects by increasing the 
competition for whaling areas. Bergersen, Holtedahl and Christophersen fronted a purely 
Norwegian expedition and what started as a plan of a Swedish-British expedition (reviving the 
plans from 1914) and continued as a Norwegian-British-Swedish expedition suddenly turned 
into plans of a purely Norwegian expedition in the hands of the NGS.113 Yet when Ahlmann 
proposed his plans in Oslo in May 1946 at the Norwegian Geographical Society (NGS), he 
presented a joint Norwegian-British-Swedish expedition to Dronning Maud Land. The plan was 
also presented at the RGS in London and the SSAG in Stockholm114 Ahlmann declared the 
expedition to be under Norwegian flag, due to Norway’s territorial rights in the area. While he 
did not specify the countries of cooperation when mentioning the realisation of his plans (the 
original pre-war idea mentioned a possible cooperation including Denmark and Iceland), 
Ahlmann sought the support from his closest circle. He finishes by highlighting the uniqueness 
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of the research area in reference to the expeditions main objective, climate change, and that it 
should be investigated preferably "by scientists and from circles in whom I've gotten to know, 
cooperate with and deeply appreciate".115 On the Norwegian side, the NGS overtook 
responsibility for the preparation of the expedition and put its committee to work planning the 
expedition. Ahlmann informed the Norwegian Ministry of Trade that the NGS Antarctic 
Committee was operational, on May 21st, 1946. In his official briefing, he argued that the 
imminent British recognition of the Norwegian claim in Antarctica made them a natural 
collaborator for the expedition and asked if Norway had any political objections to a British 
participation. By underlining his "purely scientific interests" when presenting the research 
programme, he defined his role as a scientific expert, leaving it to the NGS committee to push 
the potential outcome and political gains for the Norwegian state forward.116 The decision in 
favour of a Norwegian participation gave Foreign Minister Lange sufficient reason to execute 
and expedite the plans for a new Norwegian Polar Institute. The expedition plans also were a 
driving force in Ahlmann's plan of bringing Harald Ulrik Sverdrup back to Norway.117 
Ahlmann's wish was to ensure Nordic leadership in the geophysics, which is frequently 
mentioned in his correspondence, and ties with his view of "science as a marker of a modern 
state's power".118 And in September 1946 the plan for the Norwegian Polar Institute was 
revealed by the Ministry of Trade.  
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Meanwhile the Royal Geographical Society and the Scott Polar Research Institute established 
the British Committee in late 1946. The Committee was also known as the Joint Polar Research 
Committee, because the two actors shared responsibility for its operation. The aim of the 
committee was "…to facilitate scientific cooperation in Antarctic exploration and research with 
similar committees or institutes abroad...".119 It consisted of 12 members led by Lord 
Wakehurst, and included liaison officers and representatives from Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa.120 A smaller sub-committee consisted of: 
L.P. Kirwan (The Royal Geographic Society) 
J.N. Wordie (Professor Cambridge) 
Brian Roberts (Scott Polar Institute) 
This smaller committee ended up with the responsibility of the preparations, as the Joint 
Committee was "too cumbersome to deal with".121 
 
The Swedish Committee consisted of: 122 
Professor Hans Ahlmann (Stockholm College) 
Professor B. Lindblad (State Board of Natural Science) 
Dr. C. Mannerfelt (Svenska Sällskapet for Antropoligi och Geografi) 
Commander N. Unnérus  
Naturally, Ahlmann became the main representative at meetings and in promoting the 
emblematic scientific justification of climate change. 
 
The NGS Antarctic committee continued its work in planning for the expedition. While the 
Norwegian government had given its support to a Norwegian-led international expedition, 
strong figures in and connected to the NGS wanted a different say in the matter. Olaf Holtedahl 
and Erling Christophersen still favoured an exclusively national expedition, while Bergersen 
(now a Norwegian envoy in Stockholm) now pressed for cooperation with Britain and Sweden. 
Christophersen led the plans in the nationalistic direction, wanting the Norwegian committee 
in charge of the expedition, he even discouraged contact with Ahlmann. As president of the 
NGS and part of the Antarctic committee, Christophersen acquired the lead in the scientific 
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planning. In reality, he scrapped Ahlmann's plan in favour of his own.123 His (and the NGS’) 
views were coloured by political lens of the interwar area, when privately funded expeditions 
and strong connections to the whaling industry had prevailed. Perhaps, Christophersen had little 
faith in receiving government funding, as there was no tradition for it, and trusted the 
cooperation with the whaling companies to sponsor his plans instead. This would have meant 
a trade-off with science to secure potential whaling areas. Christophersen and the NGS were 
already negotiating with the Whaling Association for a separate expedition departing in 1947, 
which Christophersen saw as the prelude to the larger undertaking to Dronning Maud Land in 
1948-49. The North Star expedition was set for the Amundsen Sea and Peter I Island with the 
interests of the whaling industry in focus. Continuing on the pre-war tradition, Christophersen 
envisioned the North Star expedition as the start of a continued exploration programme in 
cooperation with the whaling industry.124 When asking for government funding to charter a ship 
for the North Star expedition, the NGS and Christophersen assured Trade Minister Lars 
Evensen of the "self-evident" scientific value of the expedition, underlining the importance of 
training new scientists as reasons to grant the proposal.125 Anders Orvin at the NSIU disputed 
Christophersen's plans of a prelude (whaling-sponsored) expedition in his letter to the Ministry 
of Trade on October 18th 1946, concluding that the exploration of new whaling areas should be 
left to the whalers themselves and not involve state financing. Still the NGS was granted 
funding to procure a ship for this prelude-expedition on October 24th. When Christophersen 
contacted the NSIU and Orvin to assist in the logistics of the proposed joint expedition (as was 
wished by the Ministry and Foreign Minister Lange), Orvin announced that the office was too 
busy with its own Arctic expedition preparations.126 The NGS was now left with the full 
responsibility of the preparations of both expeditions. In its current state, the ship North Star 
was not suitable for Antarctic exploration. And the funding for the second expedition to 
Dronning Maud Land awaited government decision. In a letter to H.U. Sverdrup in February 
1947 Christophersen summarised the NGS expedition plans and asked him to lead the 
organising committee of both expeditions—which H.U. Sverdrup declines. Christophersen lays 
out the NGS's wishes to expand its work within the field of geography and establish its position 
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nationally in its new headquarters at Polhøgda (Fridthjof Nansen's house). He underlined that 
the NGS expansion was not to compete with the new Polar Institute (which Harald Ulrik 
Sverdrup was appointed to run), but, rather, a favourable start of cooperation between the two, 
with the NGS doing the ground work to financially secure geographic research, especially 
considering the upcoming expedition. The NGS’ view of the expedition was nationalistic and 
heavily reliant on private funding from the whaling industry, while Sverdrup (and the Ministry 
of Industry) envisaged a state financed international operation.127 As Christophersen left for 
Washington to take on the work as cultural attaché at the Norwegian embassy in early 1947, a 
new NGS Antarctic committee was formed, consisting of: 128 
Sverre Petterssen (leader of the committee) 
Bernt Balchen (pilot/aviator) 
Finn Lützow-Holm (commander captain) 
Prof Olaf Holtedahl (geology) 
Prof W. Werenskiold (glaciology) 
Captain H.E. Hansen (topography)  
Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen (Major general)  
 
The new committee continued the plans of Christophersen, however, slightly more benevolent 
towards international cooperation. A public statement in April 1947, tells of an international 
expedition to Dronning Maud Land in 1948-49. Heavily focusing on the Norwegian leadership, 
and the fact that "... there is at present a shortage of trained personnel, and it would be difficult 
for Norway alone to find all needed specialists." The international expedition would be 
preceded by a reconnaissance expedition with the North Star in 1947-48.129 The international 
expedition would be led by the nationalistic polar veteran Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen.130  
When the Ministry of Industry had made no proposition to the Norwegian parliament by June 
1947, John Giæver at the NSIU (now proposed as leader of the wintering party of the NBSX) 
expressed his concerns in a correspondence with Riiser-Larsen when he could not receive a 
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reply. Giæver was concerned that the Norwegian government was backing out.131 The Ministry 
continued to postpone their decision. 
 
Up until the first meeting of representatives was held in Oslo in July 1947, with the three nations 
present, the expedition had only consisted of informal discussions and plans on paper, finally 
these plans had started to materialize. Attending this first meeting were: 132  
Reverend Fleming (chairman) (GB)  
Mr Kirwan (GB) 
Squadron leader J.F. Davis (GB) 
Prof Ahlmann (SWE) 
Dr. Sverre Petterssen (NO) 
Mr Bernt Balchen (NO) 
Mr Thv. Einang (NO) (Ministry of Industry) 
Prof Olaf Holtedahl (NO) 
Major N. Jørstad (NO) 
Commodore F. Lützow-Holm (NO) 
General H. Riiser-Larsen (NO) 
Prof W. Werenskiold (NO) 
 
At this first meeting of representatives, Sverre Petterssen was elected chairman of the meeting, 
He stated that although there was great interest shown by the scientists in each country, none 
of the participating governments had yet "…formally undertaken to co-operate or to provide 
funds.". The main purpose of the meeting therefore consisted of planning the expedition 
programme and examining the total costs and how it would be distributed between the three 
countries.133 Contributions from the Geographical Magazine Trust Fund and the Swedish 
Society for Geography and Anthropology had covered the initial expenses.134 The Norwegian 
NGS committee would press for a dialogue with the Ministry of Industry in acquiring the ship 
Svalbard135, and Major general Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen was appointed leader of the expedition, 
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due to his knowledge of the area. The British air representative offered assistance and a 
complete air crew from the Royal Air Force, but further communication between the British 
and Norwegian representatives underlines at least one of the aerial surveys would have to be 
Norwegian, due to the national element and political importance that cartography held. The 
preliminary budget was presented, and the rough estimates divided between the countries. As 
the expedition was under Norwegian leadership and working on Norwegian territory, Norway 
agreed to shoulder the largest share. A sub-committee for the detailed preparation of the 






Agreeing to reunite when the financial contributions from each country was settled, no later 
than December 1947, the representatives left to continue on the plan. But, despite the support 
from the Foreign Ministry and Lange, the NGS failed to raise the money for the expedition and 
the problems of acquiring a suitable ship further impeded the plans. As many ships had been 
lost during the war, and the production of new ships and repair of damaged ones was slow, 
there was an overall shortage of ships. Most of the fishing fleet vessels were too small, and the 
merchant fleet was occupied elsewhere. In September 1947 it was clear that the expedition had 
to be postponed, and the Swedish and British governments were informed of the situation.137 
After failing to obtain the North Star for the trial run, the NGS equipped the small whaler 
Brategg in October, and sent it on a Whaling Association-sponsored expedition led by the NGS 
to explore the area around Peter I Island. Under the pretence of obtaining scientific results and 
investigating the whale and plankton stocks, the findings were ultimately confiscated by the 
Whaling Association due to its commercial value.138  
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Still hoping to achieve government funding on its own, a note from the NGS committee to the 
Ministry of Industry on November 7th in 1947139 presented the plans for a scientific expedition 
to depart in the fall of 1948. It was a revised and downscaled expedition meant to chart the coast 
of Dronning Maud Land as a reaction to the news of Finn Rønne's proposed expedition to 
establish stations in the area.140 Ahlmann objected to the plans, as he could not see its scientific 
value and, in a correspondence with Kirwan, he expressed his qualms towards the NGS.141 In 
February 1948 he further agitated the NGS by holding a lecture for the Whaling Association 
about his Antarctic plans without consulting with the NGS first.142 In April 1948, while the 
Ministry of Industry still deferred the proposition for the expedition, the NGS and its committee 
advocated that because of other interested nations’ large activity in Antarctica, it was of the 
utmost importance for Norway's position in the Antarctic that this case was settled soon, 
although realising the departure had to be postponed until 1949.143 The financial delay put the 
final nail in the coffin for the NGS committee. A summary by Sverre Petterssen of the 
expedition plans and scientific values, sent to the Ministry, states that the NGS recommended 
the new Polar Institute taking full responsibility of the planning upon Harald Ulrik Sverdrup's 
arrival.144  
 
 Sverdrup executes the plan 
In March 1948, when the newly formed Norwegian Polar Institute—and Harald Ulrik Sverdrup 
himself—took over the planning, the (snow)ball started rolling. Sverdrup was informed in April 
by the Ministry of Industry of the wish to delay any decision of funding the expedition until a 
re-organisation was carried out and a revision of plans had been made.145 Sverdrup started 
working on a revised plan and met with Ahlmann on April 23rd to discuss further.146 There had 
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been "considerable unofficial discussions" between the three participating countries in 1947 
and 1948 to organise and plan of the expedition.147 Sverdrup fully immersed himself into the 
preparations before the second meeting of representatives from all three countries was held in 
Cambridge, in May 1948. There, the new revised plans for the expedition were proposed to the 
attendees: 148 
Prof Ahlmann (SWE) 
Reverend Fleming (GB) 
Mr Kirwan (GB) 
Dr. Brian Roberts (GB) 
Mr Wordie (GB) 
Prof Sverdrup (NO) 
Dr. Sverre Petterssen (NO) 
 
Sverdrup proposed that the expedition land directly by ship, not by aircraft, with assistance 
from whalers—which the NGS had dismissed as impractical.149 The aircrafts would be used for 
reconnaissance only. The presented scientific plans based on the suggestions at the Oslo 
meeting in 1947. The cost of a large wintering party (15 members), with reservations that there 
were suitable scientists available, would be justified by the scientific work since the expedition 
already was a costly and ambitious undertaking.150 The choice of expedition members were to 
be made on a national level, with international consultation.151 Previous commitments regarding 
expedition personnel were not considered binding, but it was agreed that the expedition leader 
would be Norwegian, due to the fact that the expedition was under Norwegian leadership, sailed 
under the Norwegian flag to strengthen Norwegian interests in Antarctica. A Swedish or British 
leader would have been politically unacceptable.152 John Giæver was later appointed leader of 
the expedition.153 Regarding funding, it was considered reasonable that Britain and Sweden took 
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responsibility of 1/5 of the cost each.154 Norway would make the "…major financial 
contribution in view of their leadership and in recognition of their prime responsibility for the 
area". The British representatives indicated the need of an official invitation to participate 
before they would approach their government in asking for funding.155 The details of the plans 
now rested on Sverdrup and the NPI. The representatives agreed to constitute an International 
Co-ordinating Committee - consisting of four members from each country and Harald Ulrik 
Sverdrup ex-officio, that would come into operation after an official invitation had been made. 
The committee furthermore had the possibility to bring in other experts or send deputies to 
meetings.156 Now it was up to Sverdrup to prove the value of his new Institute and raise the 
money in Norway.  
On May 14th, Sverdrup presented his proposal to the Ministry of Industry. While the 
proposal for funding was handled by the Ministry in early June, word of the joint expedition 
reached the media which published a story. Kirwan corresponded with Sverdrup and was upset 
because the meeting had agreed to keep the plans confidential until an official invitation had 
been made. Sverdrup replied that he had, without luck, tried to stop the publication and stated 
that "…some publicity is desirable now, in order to build up a public opinion in favour of the 
expedition".157 Sverdrup then successfully secured the government grant for the expedition on 
the 21th of May 1948 on the premise of the expedition sailed under Norwegian flag and under 
Norwegian leadership.158 Sverdrup was thrilled by the quick decision of the Norwegian 
Parliament – later realising this was the exception.159 The Ministry made it clear the Polar 
Institute was responsible for the planning and execution of the expedition.160With the expedition 
thus having received the blessing of the Norwegian government, official invitations to 
participate in the expedition were sent from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry to Britain and 
Sweden in the summer of 1948, although it was originally a Swedish idea and Ahlmann had 
invited Britain before Norwegian participation. The Norwegian invitations highlighted the 
focus on scientific cooperation and stated that the scientific staff of the wintering party would 
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consist of equal number of participants from each nation but be executed under Norwegian 
leadership.161  
Sverdrup contacted the NGS in order to appoint a new revised committee next. Due to its 
knowledge of the previous planning, it was necessary for Sverdrup to have the NPI on board. 
At the very least, he hoped to establish the goodwill of the NGS for his planning. He asked 
Petterssen to consider suitable members reflecting the scientific programme of the expedition, 
and to help with the preparations.162 The new members in the reconstructed NGS Antarctic 
committee of July 1948 were as follows: 163  
Prof Olaf Holtedal (geology) 
Prof W. Werenskiold (glaciology) 
Captain H.E. Hansen (topography)  
Director Hesselberg (meteorology) 
 
Harald Ulrik Sverdrup's diplomatic handling of the NGS failure and his strong hand on the 
planning soon made the NGS committee redundant. Hansen thus stepped out of the committee 
in September due to his workload, leaving the topography work for "the competent staff at the 
NPI".164 
 
When the three leaders of the national committees (Sverdrup, Ahlmann and Kirwan) and their 
respective representatives met in Stockholm, in September 1948, further steps towards the 
finalisation of the scientific programme were undertaken. Substantiating the research and 
scientific value of the results were set to be the main motive for the expedition. A press release 
from the September meeting notes that if other planned expeditions165 to Antarctica would to be 
executed, the value of research done on the NBSX would multiply.166 This statement was meant 
to put pressure on the Swedish and British governments to grant money for the expedition, not 
just for the value of science, but also for the presence it would show in Antarctica. 
Finally, the plans for the expedition seemed to come true. In October 1948 Ahlmann wrote to 
Giæver and expressed Liljequist’s, Schytt’s and his own excitement that after 2,5 years of hard 
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work the expedition finally seemed to be realised.167 The Swedish funding of 300 000 Swedish 
kronor was settled late 1948 (October 22nd).168 In late November 1948, however, the British 
contribution was still not settled.169 Sverdrup wrote in a letter to Ahlmann on December 4th that 
he was disappointed and that the unsettled British contribution delayed the plans at this point.170 
Kirwan corresponded with Sverdrup regarding a meeting held at the Foreign Office regarding 
the British grant held in early December. The discussion had become “tied up in political 
considerations" with concerns regarding the Norwegian attitude towards the project of the UN 
Trusteeship for the Antarctic and how this affected the expedition.171 At the end, however, 
scientific arguments and the value of friendly cooperation won the votes. The British 
government granted 20 000 £.172 A later addition of 13 000 £ from the RAF was to cover the 
expenses of the aircrew.173.  
The problem of finding a suitable ship for the expedition was still an ongoing affair. Several 
possibilities had been discussed; the original plan had been hiking with whaling ships but 
resulted in costing the same as hiring a sealing ship specifically for the expedition. Although 
the NPI had gotten several offers from sealers, most ships were considered too small to fit the 
expedition crew and their equipment. A request for additional funding was submitted in the 
summer of 1949 in order to alter and fit the newly acquired seal hunting vessel Norsel from the 
Jacobsen brothers. In his letter to the Ministry of Industry on June 1st, Sverdrup stated that the 
Norsel was crucial for the departure of the expedition. Norway had promised to arrange 
transportation for the expedition and a further delay would be very unfortunate considering the 
other participating countries and advancement in preparations.174 While the undertaking 
eventually was felicitous, Sverdrup had his hands full in coordinating the three committees, 
organising the equipment, and seeing to the training of the expedition personnel. A press release 
on August 3rd telling of the soon-to depart expedition –a departure date was set in about three 
months—, reports that "the cooperation between the three countries has run very smoothly".175 
But at the meeting between the representatives in September 1949 plans were far from settled. 
There were continuous discussions on who (and if) to cooperate with. The uncertain situation 
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in Europe with increased Soviet power had led to the formation of a Western Union alliance 
with Britain and France in charge. In April 1949 this was expanded with the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), in which Norway joined.176 This left Sweden side-lined, as the 
discussions of a Scandinavian defence union between Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Iceland were aborted the same year. Sweden continued its neutrality policy, with informal 
cooperation with the US and Western Union alliance.177 With US involvement in Antarctica, 
Britain wished for a stronger cooperation within the Dominion. For the first season a 
collaboration with a South African meteorologist was made to join the Norsel as an observer 
and an official invitation was sent from the Norwegian Foreign Office.178 Australia had a desire 
to have greater participation in the expedition, but it was noted that the already agreed 
Australian observer would do, at least for the first season, as planning was already well under 
way. Later, when planning the second (midtrip) visit, a wish to add another glaciologist was 
proposed by Ahlmann, and that this could be an opportunity to expand the Australian 
participation.179 In regards to a cooperation with the United States (as were indicated as a wish 
from the US, but never put forward as a formal request), the committee was reluctant to send 
out invitations or appoint an official observer as "…then we might well have to extend similar 
invitations to other nations which might be very undesirable."180 The unwelcomed nation they 
aimed at was the USSR. At the meeting in May 1950 the question on observers was raised 
again, and an agreement to "follow the same procedure … to refrain from sending out 
invitations, but consider each request for sending an observer on the basis of its merits".181 
As for the scientific cooperation, arrangements were made for radio communication and 
coordination of the meteorological recordings with the French Antarctic Expedition, and further 
extension to the Australian Expedition and the FIDS.182 The weather data and knowledge of 
weather system was of great strategic value, both military and commercial. 
At the final meeting in October 1949 the finishing touches were put on the expedition plans. 
The Norsel would sail south on December 1st at the latest. Carrying most of the men and 
supplies, catching up in the south with the whaling factory ship Thorshøvdi, which carried the 
rest of the crew and the 60 dogs. The Norsel would then head south towards the barrier and 
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unload the expedition on the barrier in the vicinity of 10ºW (close to Selbukta, an area 
previously mapped), alternatively further east. As a last alternative they would establish a 
meteorological station at Bouvet Island for the first winter season. The main objective was to 
establish the wintering base and undertake a general aerial survey of the area around the main 
base. The Norsel would then return north, stopping by Cape Town unloading the air crew and 
observers before heading to the seal hunting grounds outside Newfoundland. The rest would 
have to be provided during the second season visit.183 
 
 Heading for the south 
In mid-November 1949, the expedition left Norway and reached Dronning Maud Land on the 
11th February 1950, establishing the wintering camp. When naming the winter camp, names 
like "Triad" and "Trio"184 had been suggested during the planning sessions, to display the joint 
cooperation between the three countries. Especially Ahlmann had been insistent on having a 
camp name displaying the three-state cooperation. Harald Ulrik Sverdrup on the other hand had 
favoured a name that displayed the Norwegian leadership, like "Little Norway".185 None of the 
suggestions had been favoured by all involved parties and the decision was left up to the 
wintering party.186 Giæver noted that the naming of the base had been an issue amongst the crew 
for some time, and suggestions like "Little United Nations" and "Nor-Brit-Svea" were not 
received with joy. When suggesting the name "Maudheim" to Giæver, Sverdrup states that the 
name "Maudheim" was fitting for several reasons.187 In a correspondence letter to J.M. Wordie, 
he elaborates: "This is a short name which will locate the base geographically as lying on Queen 
Maud Land".188 A press release following the naming decision stated that "the name is a 
commemoration to the deceased Norwegian Queen Maud189 and has a form that reminisces 
names used by earlier Norwegian expeditions". Framheim was the name of the base on 
Amundsen's 1911 expedition to Antarctica, to which he sailed in Fridtjof Nansen's ship Fram.190 
and Queen Maud was also the origin of the territorial name of Dronning Maud Land.191 The 
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base name, with strong connection to earlier Norwegian explorers can be seen as a political 
motive to solidify Norway’s territorial claim and to show a continued presence in the area. 
The composition of the expedition members was first and foremost based on their 
scientific qualifications, still most of the Norwegian and British members possessed military 
backgrounds, bearing in mind the world war had ended 4 years earlier (John Giæver was captain 
in the Norwegian Air Force reserve, and Alan Reece and Gordon Robin FIDS-veterans).192 And 
when arriving at Maudheim Schytt (SWE) was placed as 2nd in command and Robin (GB) as 
3rd. In a note explaining this decision, Giæver apologised for the use of this military 
terminology, saying that they were popular at the base and that he considered it the best way to 
favour all three nations.193 This apology accentuates the wish to maintain a civil venture, and 
by highlighting their devotion to cooperation and science build upon the constructed image for 
the expedition as an apolitical expedition.194 
Yet in the context of the accompanying observers and aerial crews, other motives 
become apparent. On the way south in the first season, the Norsel was carrying several 
observers. The South African observer (Joe A. King) was a senior meteorologist and head of 
the weather forecasting and aviation branches of the Union Weather Bureau. His presence was 
explained by arrangements on transmissions of daily weather reports coordinated by the 
weather services in South-Africa and in cooperation with other countries195 and the whaling 
fleet. Upon its return, the expedition was to create a synoptic weather analysis, complimenting 
other international studies on weather systems. But at a daily basis, it provided vital weather 
data from the Southern Oceans to the whaling industry and all other ships and operations in the 
southern hemisphere.196 This was of interest for both the military and commercial investors, and 
the methods and results would profit operations not only in the Antarctic, but also in the 
Arctic.197 
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The Australian observer (Philip G. Law) was a lecturer in physics at Melbourne University and 
an officer-in-charge in Australian National Antarctic Research Expedition (ANARE).198 He 
took interest in studying the expedition’s logistics and transport for further Australian 
exploration of the Antarctic.199 
Also joining was a Times journalist (John H Marsh) and a cameraman from British Crown Film 
Unit (Tom Stobart) to report on the expedition for the general public.  
From a British perspective this was also in the interest of strengthening relations within the 
Commonwealth, where the NBSX could be an arena of securing political relations.200 
Aerial support was required for the realisation of the expedition and its research 
programme. Cartography was one of the main surveys of the programme, as maps were 
valuable to both the whalers and the Norwegian government. By charting unknown areas of the 
coast and inland and placing Norwegian names on mountains and ice sheets, and replacing the 
previously given German names, made the foundations of Norwegian sovereignty in Dronning 
Maud Land. In the first season, the aerial support was provided by the British Royal Air Force 
(RAF), bringing a crew of two pilots, three n.c.o. ground crews and two Auster aircrafts. It was 
the first time that the RAF operated in the Antarctic, and the crew and their aircrafts were put 
to good use in finding a suitable landing place for the expedition and in surveying the coastline 
and hinterland, and sketching and photographing the coast and crevasses.201 Under the 
leadership of Squadron leader G.B. Walford, the crew spent an overall 50 hours in the air and 
surveyed as far as 200 km from the base, discovering new mountain range. Aircraft 
modifications had been required on the motor and radio to operate in cold weather conditions, 
and testing of ski-plane handling were done. In addition, clothing and other equipment were 
tested, including additional RAF radio equipment on board the Norsel. 202 One of the RAF 
corporals – Quar – joined as assistant radio operator and became the 15th man on the 
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expedition.203 Upon his return Walford writes in The Times that he found the expedition "an 
enjoyable and profitable adventure".204 
For the second summer season, Harald Ulrik Sverdrup and Brian Roberts joined the 
Norsel. On their way south, they stopped by South Africa to overlook the gathering of 
meteorological data and the results J. King had created at the Union Weather Bureau. Joining 
as an observer was British Naval officer (Forster), who was training in ice navigation. In his 
report after the expedition, he notes that it was very convenient to join a civilian vessel for his 
research on ice and ice navigation in both polar areas.205 A second observer came from the 
Swedish Air Force: Captain Reinhold von Essen who later was put in charge of aircrafts and 
crew on the 3rd season. He had similar plans as Forster, in proceeding north with the Norsel to 
the Canadian Arctic on the return from the Antarctic. There he planned to meet with the 
Canadian Air Force in Halifax and gain additional knowledge on planes and flights, aerial 
cartography and survey and radio communication. But Norsel's tight schedule made a visit to 
Halifax impossible and the ship left for Newfoundland. When von Essen contacted his superiors 
to ask if he could change his plans and meet up with the Air Force north of Hudson Bay, he 
was not granted a tour to Canada. Looking into the reasons why he was denied this trip, 
Lewander proposes it is as a reaction from the Swedish Air Force and Foreign Office as to what 
is on the brink of the Swedish neutrality doctrine, and what could be seen as a breach to this.206 
Following the Norsel down to Maudheim was an additional joining member of the wintering 
party John Jelbart, an Australian observer and physicist.207 To assist in the forthcoming field 
work, as the workload at Maudheim was extensive. Also with the Norsel was Stig Hallgren, a 
Swedish photographer from Artfilm of Stockholm hired to produce a motion picture film. 
During the stay he expressed a wish to join as the 17th man of the wintering party, and his wish 
was granted. Sverdrup saw the value of acquiring good professional photographs and film 
material and an additional man to help with the workload.208 
In the second summer Norway was responsible for the aerial surveying programme. Conducted 
by Widerøes Flyveselskap and Polarfly AS with one C-5 Polar and one KZ.III for shorter 
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flights.209 A crew of five, with Kaare Friis-Baastad and Anders Jacobsen as pilots, Sigvard 
Kjellberg as air photographer and two mechanics. The plan was to survey and photograph the 
area between 20ºW and 15ºE, to chart the ice barrier, the areas of the field parties and the region 
in the east – for comparison with the German work of 1939.210 Widerøe also performed testing 
of their own equipment (newly installed and untested radio and radio compass) and military 
equipment provided by the Norwegian Air Force.211 
The weather at Maudheim the second season was exceptionally bad, making the aerial surveys 
difficult. Adding to the fact that the Norwegian pilots were inexperienced and ill-equipped 
made matters worse.212 Sverdrup expresses his annoyance in his diary on several occasions. An 
episode where Friis-Baastad is confronted with the deviation of his compass and Forster steps 
in to correct it, showing a 7º deviation, infuriates Sverdrup. And when the C-5 crashes 10 days 
later with Friis-Baastad and Liljequist, both with only minor injuries, Sverdrup is agitated. 
Clearly wanting to make a better result next season Sverdrup writes a five-page summary of 
errors and improvements and hopes the Swedish Air Force has better luck.213 
On the last and third season the Norsel was accompanied by two British Naval observers 
(Blair – Naval Aviation and Higgins – Submarine service).214 Together with topographer Nils 
Roer from the wintering party, Higgins and Blair charted the coast of Kronprinsesse Märthas 
Land – 1200 km.215 This work, with combining measurements and charting from the ground 
and photography from the aerial surveys gave reliable maps of the region to support the 
Norwegian claim in Dronning Maud Land.216 
Along with the Norsel was a Norwegian journalist from Aftenposten (Halvdan Hydle) who sent 
short stories from the happenings during this last trip down and the return of the wintering men. 
In this last summer the Swedish Air Force were in charge of the aerial surveys. This was the 
first time operating outside Swedish boarders. The crew of 6 men was under the leadership of 
captain Reinhold von Essen, who followed as an observer on the second season. With the 
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aircrafts (one Beechcraft 18-R and one SAAB Safir) and accompanied by Widerøe's air 
photographer Helge Skappel they photographed half a million square kilometres.217 The 
Swedish Air Force returned with great results. Not only to the expedition, but also considering 
the military interests. They originally operated to aid the survey work and in emptying the base, 
but also tested their equipment, obtained experience on cold weather operations and 
communication and received information on the system of weather reports. This was especially 
important considering the ongoing military build-up in the Arctic.218  
Although there had been discussions in the committees regarding the advisability of military 
attendance (fighting services) on the expedition, it was agreed that so far as possible it should 
be operated on a civilian basis.219 Still the military presence (air forces) was a necessity to carry 
out the expeditions scientific programme.220 Further research in the military archives could 
expand upon this topic and give useful insight of the internal Military motives. 
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Chapter 4: The aftermath 
 Science versus the cost 
On Norsel's return from Maudheim in 1952, an additional grant for the expedition was given 
by the Norwegian Government. The funds were granted along with a statement that described 
the expedition’s "according to the received rapports [...] excellent cooperation between the three 
nations" and stated that "the scientific goals for the expedition have been more than 100% 
obtained".221 But was this really so? The scientific programme had been comprehensive and the 
data was compiled diligently.222 Even though there had been money allotted for after the 
expedition’s return in order to prepare the results for publication, upon its return, most of the 
money had already been spent to cover expedition costs. Several additional requests for funding 
were sent to the Norwegian Government in the years to come to finalise the scientific results.223 
Upon their return, the scientific members of the expedition started the task of working up the 
results. Many of them had their future careers at stake. Even though they had acquired field 
experience from the Antarctic, these skills were of was advantage in the academic environment 
they now found themselves in. After all, the work conducted afterwards was of much more 
importance.224 In February 1953, Kirwan wrote to Sverdrup that the British crew member 
Charles Swithinbank needed an additional three months to complete his work writing up his 
results on glaciological study satisfactorily.225 At the NPI, on the other hand, Nils Roer –the 
expedition’s topographic surveyor—and others were still working on the Maudheim material 
in 1957-58. After Sverdrup’s sudden death in 1957, Orvin stepped in as chief of the NPI. At 
this point, the case of the unfinished and unpublished results from the NBSX was a hot political 
topic, and a bit of a national scandal. One could risk other nations putting their names on 
mountains and glaciers as it was still "unmapped" as long as the material was unpublished.226 
Which led to the realisation of more government funding to the institute. The topographical 
work was prioritised, as it could be used as political currency in questions on sovereignty in the 
polar regions and in the planning for the forthcoming International Geophysical Year (IGY).227 
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Yet, temporary assistance had to be employed to compile materials from the expedition until 
the beginning of the 1960s. Nils J Schumacher, the chief meteorologist, for example, worked 
on the Maudheim material for ca. 12 years while on leave from Det Norske Meteorologiske 
Institutt (the Norwegian Meteorological Institute). When the IGY started in 1957, the scientists 
were asked to supply advanced copies of their work as they were still writing up the results.228 
In a 1958 review of the then recently published research papers from the expedition, W.H. 
Ward commented that “…it was an exceptionally good expedition; […] so we can only hope 
that it will prove exceptional in its publication record and become a model expedition in all 
respects.”229 
While the last chapter of the six-volume expedition report was not concluded and published (in 
a limited number) before 1998230, the expedition nonetheless had more immediate scientific 
consequences. The results from the expedition facilitated five of the members of the expedition 
(Liljequist, Robin, Wilson, Swithinbank, Schytt) earning academic degrees due to the scientific 
work done one the NBSX.231 Many of the scientific staff went on to successful careers, thus 
personally benefiting more from the expedition than the organisations that had backed it.232 For 
the Norwegian scientists on the other hand, the situation was less profitable. Already holding 
academic degrees, they simply returned to their day-work. What had been a prerequisite in 
obtaining government funding – the importance of training new scientists – was not achieved 
in Norway.233 
The total joint costs for the expedition and the after work was estimated from at least 
2,14 million Norwegian kroner to a maximum of 3,1 million in 1948234, with the Norwegian cut 
being between 1,5 to 2,5 million.235 A cost that turned out to be highly underestimated. In the 
                                                 
228 Charles Swithinbank, Foothold on Antarctica : The First International Expedition (1949-1952) : Through the 
Eyes of its Youngest Member (Lewes: Book Guild, 1999): 227 
229 W. H. Ward, "Scientific Research in Antarctica: Review," review of Norwegian-British-Swedish Antarctic 
Expedition, 1949-52. Scientific Results; Vol. I, Meteorology: Part 2, Surface Observations; Sub-Part A, Air 
Pressure, V. Hisdal, O. Amble, N. J. Schumacher; Vol. II, Meteorology: Part 1, Energy Exchange of an 
Antarctic Snowfield. Sub-Part A, Short-Wave Radiation, 1956; Sub-Part B, Long-Wave Radiation and 
Radiation Balance, 1956; Sub-Part C, Wind Structure in the Low Layer, 1957; Sub-Part D, Surface Inversions 
and Turbulent Heat Transfer, 1957, G. H. Liljequist; Vol. II, Meteorology, Part 2, Special Studies. Sub-Part 
A, Halo-Phenomena and Ice Crystals, G. H. Liljequist, The Geographical Journal 124, no. 2 (1958): 238 
230 Barr, Norway, a Consistent Polar Nation?: Analysis of An Image Seen Through the History of the Norwegian 
Polar Institute: 290 
231 Schytt, Med känsla för is : om polarforskaren Valter Schytt och gåtorna hans Antarktisexpedition bidrog till 
att lösa: 152 
232 Roberts, A Frozen Field of Dreams: Science, Strategy, and the Antarctic in Norway, Sweden, and the British 
Empire, 1912-1952: 350 
233 Ibid.: 304 
234 SATø, Arkiv fra NSIU og NP: Db 0198 10B/15 Antarktis (pressen, annen publisering) 
235 Industridepartementet, "Bev. til Norsk Polarinstitutt, kap. 545, S.tid. 855—56.— Tilleggsbev. til en antarktisk 
vitenskapelig ekspedisjon", (Oslo: Regjeringen, 1948) 
 47 
first proposal for funding submitted in May 1948, it was highlighted that the costs would run 
for several years after the expedition and that the publishing of the material would take about 
five years to finish. Norway would be responsible to "carry the cost" for publishing of the 
results, and each country was to set aside funds to cover the expenses for the preparation of 
these results.236 The expedition was also expected to receive great income from articles being 
sold and the production of a movie from the expedition (e.g. as Thor Heyerdahl did on the Kon 
Tiki).237 These prospects of profit, however, soon turned sour as public interest in the continent 
far south was waning and the material for the movie was not good enough to be used in a 
cinematic movie even though it had been shot by one of the Artfilm company’s own 
photographers (Stig Hallgren who joined the expedition in the midseason trip).238 In 1950, the 
expected cost of the expedition had risen to nearly 3,9 million. More proposals asking for 
further funding were sent to the foreign and constitutional committees, in which the they were 
not very pleased with. Yet since the original proposal had had the foresight to state that all the 
costs of the expedition could not be known in advance, they planners of the expedition could 
not be criticised. When applying for more funding.239 Sverdrup had also unsuccessfully asked 
the Whaling Foundation to contribute financially on the expedition before the departure.240 In 
October 1950, he again approached the Foundation and several ship owners in Vestfold to ask 
for donations, as the meteorology and maps were of economic value to the whalers. This time 
around, he received several donations, mostly due to the fact that he had convinced the Ministry 
of Industry to allow the donators claim the expense for tax purposes.241 
The organisational part of the expedition, with the Committees in each country, as showed in 
3.1, had proved costly and awkward. The three-nation cooperation increased the expenses as 
there were three administrations, each with its individual and national requests.242 Giæver noted 
that there was less hassle with the expedition members (considering their different 
backgrounds) than with the administration of the expedition.243  
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The discussions on payment settlement in the aftermath of the expedition turned into a 
diplomatic problem between Norway and Britain, as the predicted income failed to materialize 
and both countries were short on funding. The original pledge that Norway would cover the 
cost overruns were dismissed by Sverdrup.244 In 1954, Sverdrup reported that the expedition 
costs totalled NOK 3 180 000 for the Norwegian cut alone. Sweden had contributed with SEK 
421 500 and Britain with £11 185.245 These numbers did not include some of the equipment—
the British cut was mostly given in equipment, not in cash—aerial crews and machines, salaries 
and other supplies contributed to the expedition by Sweden and Britain.246 Harald Ulrik 
Sverdrup continued to ask the Ministry of Industry for more funding in the following years.247 
He had realised long before the return of the NBSX that receiving satisfactory funding for the 
Polar Institute would prove difficult. The NPI was chronically understaffed and there was no 
prospect of hiring new staff in the near future. The funding from the Ministry allotted the 
scientific grants elsewhere, making the NPI uncompetitive compared to the universities and 
museums.248 Although the NBSX showed that international cooperation was a fruitful way to 
follow, when scientific work and results were considered, it was not enough to justify the costs 
for operations in the Antarctic. 249 Other (non-claimant) countries (e.g. South Africa and 
especially Soviet and the US). were the most active, better equipped and with possessed greater 
logistic means for such operations. With sovereign disputes flaring up again, the 1950s were 
coloured by national rivalries in the Antarctic. The superpowers’ (US and Soviet) entry to the 
continent followed and the NBSX marked the end of western Europe’s leading position in 
Antarctica.250 This dissipated the hope and intention of making the NPI a leading actor 
internationally.251 
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 Symbolic legacy  
"Of what I've seen, there is good reason to believe that the scientific results will be plenty and 
valuable. The expedition shall be written in to history as an exceptional venture…"252 
These lines were written down by Harald Ulrik Sverdrup in his diary on his visit of the camp 
in the second summer season. It proved true. The literature on the expedition constantly classify 
the expedition as a success. Still, the expedition had failed to find evidence for rapid glacial 
retraction and climate change in the Antarctic. Thus, the expedition was not able to establish it 
as a global phenomenon and as result, was unsuccessful in providing answers to its emblematic 
research motive. Other scientific ventures were highly successful, however. The expedition was 
marked by were several firsts: the first 100m ice core drilling, sending photos by radio from the 
Antarctic for the first time, measuring the ice depths on the plateau the expedition occupied, 
the first time living land fauna was recorded in the area (including new species), the first 
detailed survey of the topography of inland Dronning Maud Land and the first time measuring 
ice-velocity to compare with Northern hemisphere. The last activity mentioned, led to a 
growing understanding of how the Antarctic ice sheet controls the world sea level, and how it 
is regulating the world climate.253 The scientific results from the expedition were far from 
insignificant, but its success was worsened by the slow speed that information became public 
due the backlog of data to be processed and the understaffing in the aftermath of the expedition. 
It took over 10 years before (most of) the results were published. The administrative framework 
offered additional work and problems rather than establishing a possible template for future 
international cooperation. All its flaws and failings considered, why was the NBSX considered 
as such a success in its time and why has this evaluation persevered? 
The official story of the expedition is that of a science focused venture, not a political or 
nationalistic, or even commercial expedition as the previous eras of expeditions had been. This 
was still true even though the territorial assertion was a premise for the existence of the 
expedition, that was promoted by both the British and the Norwegian government. Its scientific 
programme and its potential significance, however, were the motivators for mobilizing 
resources in all three countries.254 Thus, the expedition existed in a state characterised by a trade-
off between science and politics. The emblematic research motive for the expedition – climate 
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change – and its result could give answers to the then present changes in the (rest of) world. Its 
relevance was of great importance and was enhanced by the international cooperation. 
Ahlmann's vision of polar scientists pursuing specialised science contributed to the 
professionalisation of polar science and enhanced the scientific programme of the expedition.255 
The NBSX originated from and was built on a research motive. The long delay in its departure, 
created possibilities for more careful preparations, both with the scientific programme and its 
equipment than expected originally.256 Through Sverdrup's administrative leadership, and their 
combined diplomatic efforts, Ahlmann and Sverdrup saw to the realisation of the expedition. 
When it failed to find direct evidence for climate change this was effaced by enhancing the 
international cooperation and collaboration.257 The results of the other scientific programmes 
(especially in cartography) were emphasized to be able to highlight the expedition’s scientific 
significance and the valuable knowledge it produced.258 But the promised maps, the most 
important political currency for the territorial claims, were, ironically, held up by lack of 
funding from the government. As the crew members and their scientific staff at home were still 
writing up results, the International Geophysical Year took place in 1957-58 and the scientists 
were asked to supply advanced copies of their work.259 The ambitious future of the NPI, that 
was envisaged Harald Ulrik Sverdrup at his return to Norway in 1948, was long gone, and he 
turned his focus to his main field of interest – oceanography – following the geopolitical trend 
of world aid.260 As for the contribution to Norwegian relations to the other participation 
countries, the effect of the expedition proved of minimal importance. Instead it weakened the 
bilateral cooperation between Norway and Britain due to the administrative difficulties and the 
disagreements on settlement in the aftermath.261 Still the expedition provided a line of 
communication for Sweden with the west alliance, without the apparent cooperation eliciting 
Soviet reaction. As the idea of a Scandinavian defence union dispersed with Norway entering 
the NATO in 1949, Sweden remained with its neutral line in politic, albeit leaning towards the 
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west.262 Even though the turbulence following the expedition, especially the disputes over 
settlement with Britain, nearly causing a diplomatic fall-out, the projected public image of 
harmony consisted.263 The later stories of the expedition builds to this view; with the stating the 
NBSX as a scientifically motivated expedition with the world’s climate in focus264, which put 
scientific investigation before geographical discovery.265 The legacy of its expedition members 
and their later work and impact (e.g. Schytt as the first Secretary of the Special Committee on 
Antarctic Research266, Gordon Robin as Director at SPRI) has also contributed to the symbolic 
image created around the expedition.267 
As the International Geophysical Year, brought the superpowers and their state-financed, 
professionalised research to Antarctica, the created image of the NBSX, made it fit the 
description as a worthy forerunner.268 And despite the bitter arguments between the participating 
countries after its return, the NBSX has a powerful symbolic legacy.269 
 
 Focusing north 
The NBSX returned to a changed world. The acute Soviet threat had diminished and with 
Norway entering the NATO, western allies were close by. Stalin's death in 1953 gave hope at 
furthering détente between the east and the west. This was reflected in the minimal NPI budgets, 
as there was no reason for the previously expected expansive presence and activity. The short-
staffed situation at the NPI, together with the decreases in government funding (except for the 
additional grants for the NBSX, the NPI received less funding every year during Sverdrup's ten 
years as director and the funding for the planned Norway Station during the IGY was paid in 
addition over the Ministry of Church Affairs and Education budget), made Sverdrup's visions 
difficult to implement. The operations in Svalbard and Northeast-Greenland continued, (as the 
had under the NSIU) occupying most of the staff and resources. With the newly established 
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Research Councils (NTNF and NAVF), responsible for distributing the research funds, and 
channelling the funds directly to the universities and museums, the NPI was left without the 
possibility to build up a scientific research institute and its influence diminished. The 
organisational structure—NPI placed under the Ministry of Industry added to the gap between 
the NPI and the universities and research institutes. Instead of being a supplier of projects, the 
NPI became a logistic supplier for research institutions.270  
As for Antarctica, H.U. Sverdrup had already given up on the idea of the NPI becoming a 
"centre for the international meteorological studies in Antarctica"271 on his return from the 
midseason trip to Maudheim in 1951. He noted in his diary that it was best to "give the land 
back to the penguins".272 Although South Africa wished for a continuance of meteorological 
surveying at Maudheim, Sverdrup was tired of the administrative challenges and costs an 
operation so far away accumulated. When the questions of a Norwegian participation in and 
plans for the forthcoming IGY were raised by the Foreign Office in 1954, Sverdrup simply 
replied "No". With limited funds there were no plans of a second operation to the Antarctic.273 
But with the rise in tensions between the east and the west, the Norwegian sovereignty claims 
in the polar regions became a political issue yet again. Increased Soviet activity in the Arctic, 
other interested nations entering the Antarctic, interspersed with the US fear of Norwegian lack 
of attending to its territorial claims, forced the plans of a new operation in the Antarctic during 
the IGY. 274 The pressure to perform science in the Antarctic became more of a burden for the 
participating countries of the NBSX than a privilege.275 Norway Station was erected in Dronning 
Maud Land in December 1956. It had originally been planned for two years, but was prolonged 
for a third season due to the continuance of Soviet and US activity and a fear of losing the 
possibility of influencing the future of Antarctic governance.276 The international cooperation 
led to the forming of the Special Committee on Antarctic Research with Schytt as its first 
Secretary. This resulted in the establishment of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, to "ensure a 
peaceful use of and scientific cooperation in Antarctica".277 Norway participated due to its 
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prolonged activity during the IGY. With the growing political attention on Svalbard due to the 
ongoing Cold war, and the waning (need for) Norwegian interest in the Antarctic, due to the 
Antarctic Treaty and a decline in whaling, Norway Station was transferred to South African 
authorities in November 1959.278 And as for the working-up of the large-scale cartography 
undertaken at Norway Station by the Norwegians: it suffered the same fate as the NBSX results. 
Because of a lack of funding and resources, they were published well over 10 years later. 
Norwegian polar policies in these years showed an inclination on losing sight of the value of 
science and its results as a symbolic value in politics. Science only became important to science 
itself. The politicians contented themselves with presence in the region itself. 
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Chapter 5: The Motives 
 Working together 
The perceived view is that the NBSX was an apolitical venture with international cooperation 
of specialised scientific importance. But this thesis shows that the motives of the expedition 
were multifaceted. All the motives prompted research in the polar areas, built on ongoing 
processes and operations, policies and geopolitical events. The motives are intertwined, 
influencing each other, and their intensity changes on a temporal scale. Therefore, it is difficult 
to separate them. In this chapter, I will therefore follow the motives during the three phases; 
before, during, and after the expedition.  
 
From the early discoveries, to the hunt for marine resources, the Antarctic was an area of 
exploration, commerce and politics. Onset by a wish to seek more knowledge, the Basic 
research motive prompted the Political and Economic motives upon the discovery of fertile 
lands and seas and the wish for control over these areas. The onset of pelagic whaling in the 
Antarctic and the technological advancements of the interwar era changed the whaling industry. 
The Economical motive was –together with the Political and Jurisdictional motive—highly 
present in the Antarctic. When whaling picked up in the post-war years, it necessitated more 
restrictive quotas for the "development of the industry".279 This action was founded on the 
Economical motive and prompted the need for knowledge of whale-stocks. With science, the 
Basic research motive, again, emerges, as the Antarctic was an advantageous area for research. 
Research influenced jurisdictional decisions and the political involvement with regards to 
whaling restrictions. The difficulties regarding the enforcement of jurisdiction in the Antarctic 
turned the Basic research motive into the justification for exercising the Jurisdictional motives. 
In addition, the Political motive utilized science as a means of strengthening sovereignty claims. 
This resulted in a trade-off between science and politics. The interwar focus on polar logistics 
spurred the Military motive in the Antarctic.280 With the FIDS, Britain already had a military 
presence in the area and engaged in active research with the Whaling Investigations in the 
Southern Oceans (discussed on page 13-14), leaning on both the Jurisdictional and Economic 
motive. During and after the Second World War, the strategic value of the polar regions came 
into focus, leading to a mobilisation around the Military motives in the Antarctic. The military 
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presence and activity also supported the Political motives in marking national presence, both 
for claimant and non-claimant countries. 
The need to strengthen sovereignty claims laid the premise for what was to become the 
NBSX. With the British need to strengthen its claims in the dispute with Argentina and Chile, 
a collaboration with the Nordic countries was desirable. The imminent British recognition of 
the Norwegian claim aspired for a cooperation. Yet, the idea for the NBSX originated from and 
was based on the Basic research motive and Ahlmann's wish to collect data that could spread 
light on the ongoing climatic changes: "one of the most powerful natural phenomena of our 
generation".281 Ahlmann was driven by his previous glacial research, and inspired by 
photographs from the Schwabenland expedition. The scientific results from the venture would 
produce knowledge that was essential to understanding the past and address the present 
changes. The Environmental motive is found in the expedition’s emblematic scientific question: 
climate change. Research was needed to find out whether it was a global phenomenon. The 
melting of glaciers in the rest of the world had already been confirmed leading to questions 
about what would happen to the earth if the same glacial retraction and ice melting also occurred 
in Antarctica. More research was needed. Potential discoveries of mineral resources due to 
melting spurred the Economical motive and acted as a motivation for the need for jurisdiction 
and political action. As for the global consequences – Ahlmann had envisioned that climate 
change and rising temperatures would co-occur with positive effects like longer growing 
seasons and more tree growth due to a rise in tree line. Simultaneously, he also predicted 
drought as a negative effect. This influenced Norway and Sweden’s Economic and Political 
motives: the scientific programme and its potential significances were primary motivators for 
mobilizing resources. The possible global effects of climate changes were closely tied to the 
Political, Environmental and Economic motives fuelling the need for research. Science brought 
knowledge; knowledge that was essential to understanding the past and predicting the future. 
Science became the instrument to legitimate Antarctic presence and validate the Jurisdictional 
motive. For Norway, science was a mean to consolidate its claim, thus giving rise to the Political 
motive. Unlike previous Norwegian ventures to the Antarctic, the NBSX was government-
funded, and operated with an official statement of national presence and consolidation. The 
Political motive was the premise for the realisation of the expedition, even though the 
expedition was not highlighted as a political expedition. Still, science was the instrument of 
marking national presence. Although there were forces driving forward an all-Norwegian 
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expedition in the wish to state national presences, the Political motive was bound to the 
symbolic value of science. Thus, the need to perform specialized science where its credibility 
was needed to underwrite political credibility.282 And with the shortage of trained personnel, an 
international cooperation was preferable for gaining the wanted results. The principle of 
effective occupation and nationalism, where sciences and their activity created the base for any 
claim, and the following scientific knowledge strengthened these.283 This was the legacy from 
Hoel and the early whalers, which loomed in the halls of politics, although the international 
visionaries Ahlmann and Sverdrup sought openness and cooperation. 
In the planning phase of the expedition, we find military presence in the composition of 
the committees. All three countries had military representatives and held contact with their 
respective military administrations.284 The scientific programme was constructed to support 
national interests, with cartography as the main objective. Charting unknown areas and naming 
land translated into printed and published maps that could be used as hard political currency in 
the disputes over sovereignty.285 The possibility of testing new equipment and train personnel 
was of great military interest. A scientific programme with planned excursions supported the 
Military motive, which drew funding from the military to the sciences.286 The emblematic 
research on climate change could reveal areas becoming more accessible due to glacial 
retraction. These findings were expected to benefit military and industrial operations and lead 
to advances in weather forecasts and communication. The use of military air crews was a 
necessity for the execution of the expedition and for the scientific surveys, with the Political, 
Jurisdictional and Economic motive adherent. The NSBX’s show of presence in the area, the 
activity and the results from science added to the Jurisdictional motive. In addition, potentially 
gained knowledge about how to secure sovereignty in these areas led to a spark in the Political 
motive. The science programme also spurred the Economic motive, as well as the Political 
motive: development within meteorology and aircraft technology created strategic interest in 
the polar regions.287 So, the practical use of science was utilized in strengthening the Norwegian 
claim in the Antarctic.288 The Basic research motive substantiated the Political motive, resulting 
in a trade-off between the two. Ahlmann stressed the disciplinary specialisation to find useful 
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results, and that cooperation was a key part.289 The cooperation was linked to mutual interests 
(and gains) for the three countries driven by Political, Economic, Military and Jurisdictional 
motives. In regards to these motives, there existed not just a potential, symbolic value of 
cooperation itself (between the nations and military), but the results from the scientific 
collaboration would also bring forth practical value. The symbolic value of science, on the 
contrary, took part in raising the international esteem of the new Norwegian Polar Institute. In 
addition, the Political motive was a part of the strengthening of specific geopolitical 
constellations, between the Nordic countries and Britain, but was soon overshadowed by US 
and Soviet domination.290 In the course of the planning of the expedition all motives were 
present, with the Basic research and Political motive as initial triggers for the others. 
During the execution of the expedition, the scientific activity and presence verified 
Norwegian sovereignty and the Political motive was achieved. The scientific programme was 
set beforehand, but ultimately modified and prioritized "on the spot" due to challenges provided 
by the location and the available the personnel. New equipment and working methods were 
tested on the expedition and ground-breaking new information about the continent was found. 
This practical value of science brought forward the Military and Economical motives. The 
NBSX delivered both knowledge to support the jurisdictional functions and to prompt the 
Economical motive further. The meteorological work performed during the expedition, 
contributed valuable knowledge of weather systems both in the short term – with daily weather 
forecasts going out– and in the long term – with the understanding of southern hemisphere 
weather systems improving significantly. The meteorological data proofed valuable to whalers 
and especially to South Africa and other interested nations (Argentina and Chile) who employed 
this them in military operations. The possibility of the discovery of mineral resources, which 
was hyped by the media, also contributed to the Economical motive. The surveying of both 
marine and on land resources, were of interest to the Norwegian government and the industry. 
With the use of new equipment on the expedition and the development of technology both the 
Political and Military motive were in focus due to the potential practical value. Although 
operating at the end of the world, the reverberations of changes in the geopolitical situation 
caught up with the expedition. The high expectations set for the newly established NPI did not 
persist and the envisions of fruitful cooperation had resulted in a hefty administration. The 
practical value derived from the expedition was not enough to maintain the political interest. 
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And so, the trade-off between science and politics only lasted until the money ran out. As for 
the Environmental motive, this was partially debunked when the scientific results showed no 
signs of glacial retraction in the Antarctic but remained highly present in the discussions of 
whaling restrictions. 
At the return and in the aftermath of the NBSX, the Basic research motive naturally lost 
its advantageous position. Whilst unsuccessful in the search for global warming, the other 
disciplines and results were highlighted, and the symbolic value of science remained. The 
continued highlighting the research had motivated innovation and interest in other areas as well. 
The Political motive, for example, was dependent on a successful scientific programme to 
maintain the prestige to strengthen its claim and the Jurisdictional motive needed the updated 
knowledge base to continue its jurisdictional functions. As for the young scientists, their 
academic degrees depended on the working up and publishing of material. In the aftermath, the 
issue of unpublished results diminished the pay-out for all these motives. Still, the symbolic 
value of the highly successful scientific programme increased the Political motive and was a 
factor in the continued additional funding for the working up of results—although funds were 
insufficient to result in publications within a reasonable time frame. The Economical motive 
decreased by the lack of potential resources—including a decline in whaling. The need for an 
updated knowledge base to exercise the jurisdictional functions along decreased along with an 
economical pay-out. Thus, the Jurisdictional motive lost its ground when the working up of the 
results after the expeditions return did not materialize or were delayed. The Military motive 
though, received value for money: personnel returned from a "civilian" expedition trained in 
arctic survival and equipment had been sufficiently tested.  
The highlighting of the scientific relevance, together with the continued unknown of the 
Antarctic made it an advantageous research area, and the Basic research motive inspired further 
scientific exploits. The scientific results still produced a practical value in the preparation for 
the upcoming IGY. In 1954, when the issue of lack of a Norwegian presence in the Antarctic 
was raised, again, a new round of scientific and political trade-off began. The old and familiar 
principal of efficient occupation became the driving force for the Political motive, in addition 
to the strengthening of specific geopolitical constellations. 
  
 59 
 Basic Research Motive 
The NBSX originated out of the Basic research motive and Ahlmann's idea. This occurred in a 
trade-off with the Political motive so that it could attain the necessary funding. This trade-off 
made little restrictions to what type of research was to be undertaken, as the actual presence of 
scientists during the expedition was sufficient to underpin sovereignty claims. The plentiful 
scientific results promised long-term gain and practical value, but in the aftermath the delay on 
working up of scientific results made the costs of finishing it too high to justify its value. Only 
when forced by political pressure prior to the forthcoming IGY, the practical value emerged, 
again and grants were given to publish (some of) the results.  
 
 Political Motive 
The need to strengthen the Norwegian sovereignty claim in the Antarctic (which was demanded 
from Britain fearing other nations’ encroachment) triggered the Political motive and was the 
premise for the realisation of the expedition. By utilising science to mark national presence and 
underlining the scientific value, the symbolic value from the results gave international prestige 
and strengthened the sovereignty claims as a trade-off between science and politics. The 
international cooperation during the expedition was part of the Political motive’s way to 
strengthen the ties between the Nordic countries and Britain. But ripples from the geopolitical 
situation and the bulky administration led to a strained relationship between the nations in the 
aftermath. The Political motive of presence in the Antarctic had been achieved. Considering the 
cost of the settlement upon the return, the symbolic value did not justify the cost. Still, the 
principal of efficient occupation resonated high among politicians. When external pressure 
questioned Norwegian sovereignty, money was allotted for the working up of the results that 
would provide political currency and save the Norwegian honour in the sovereignty question.  
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 Economic Motive 
The Economic motive was closely linked to whaling and its commercial interests and with 
subsequent jurisdictional functions. The scientific programme contributed to the commercial 
interests mostly through meteorological work. Even though there were speculations of possible 
mineral resources, these was never openly considered for economic exploitation. Still there was 
a precautionary policy to secure the jurisdictional functions in case of future possibilities. The 
Economic motive advocated the use of new technology and equipment on the expedition and 
spurred the Political, Military and Jurisdictional motives. In the years following the expedition, 
the decrease in whaling and the ensuing drop in the need for jurisdictional functions led to the 
weakening demand of economic factors.  
 
 Military Motive 
The full extent of the Military motive cannot be accounted for, as the sources I have used only 
give an overview of the external communication from the military to the committees. 
Nevertheless, these communications show a desire for cooperation due to the gain of experience 
and the possibility of training testing new equipment in an attractive arena. In addition, military 
cooperation was necessary for the execution of the expedition and its scientific programme. 
The potential results from the emblematic research also appealed to the Military motive, as 
future possibilities could be revealed. 
 
 Jurisdictional Motive 
The Jurisdictional motive is intertwined with the Political motive and was necessary to enforce 
the territorial claims in the Antarctic. The expedition and its scientific programme gave valuable 
results to the demanded knowledge base of the Jurisdictional motive. In the aftermath of the 
expedition, the delay of published results negatively affected the Jurisdictional motive. It lost 
its ground when the working up of the results failed to be accomplished within a reasonable 
time frame. An external push of the Political motive, in connection to the quickly approaching 
IGY, was required to recover the much-needed jurisdictional functions in the Antarctic.  
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 Environmental Motive 
The expedition’s emblematic scientific question, born from the Basic research motive, 
prompted the Environmental motive. Its investigations of global climate change caused the 
results and findings of the expedition to be of great potential and value. The possible glacial 
retraction bore interests to the Political (and subsequent the Jurisdictional motive), the 
Economic and the Military motive. Although the results published found an absence of 
warming trends that mirrored the ones encountered in the arctic and thus, ultimately refuted 
Ahlmann’s original motivation for undertaking the expedition, the NBSX and its legacy still 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The main research objective for this thesis has been to study the Norwegian-British-Swedish 
Expedition (NBSX), focusing on the Norwegian perspective and map the motives present. In 
order to give an account for these motives, the structure of presentation was set to follow the 
chronology of the expedition. Chapter 2 presents the period around the realisation of the 
expedition. It lays out the historical setting in order to explain the contemporary political and 
economic situation and the scientific interests and exploration in the Antarctic. The scientific 
interest resulted in Ahlmann's idea of an international operation set for Dronning Maud Land. 
The expedition to Antarctica was meant to extend his glaciological work from the Arctic to 
determine whether the contemporary climate changes were of regional or universal character. 
The possible global effects and his beliefs of Scandinavian obligation to participate in the quest 
for knowledge made him focus on international cooperation to realise his plans. Ahlmann's idea 
and plans are discussed thoroughly in 2.2. Ahlmann also had an influence in the establishment 
of the Norwegian polar institute in 1948. The institution that was to become the Norwegian 
flagship and secure Norway's role as a leading country on polar research. Due to the slow 
progress and lack of realisation of the expedition within the Norwegian Geographical Society, 
the NPI ended up with the organisational leadership of the expedition at its initiation.  
 Chapter 3: describes the planning and realisation of the expedition. The administrative 
construction of the expedition proved costly and bulky, and the committees established in the 
three countries show the political and military interests in the scientific venture. The 
international cooperation was founded on what benefited the nationalistic interests: Norway 
strove to uphold its sovereignty claims; Sweden desired a cooperation with western allies and 
Britain withed for imperialistic strengthening. Still, the NBSX was constructed and broadcasted 
as a purely scientific venture, although the only explanation for its realisation lies in the political 
motives for funding and on the military for the realisation of the scientific programme. Though, 
the sciences proved valuable both with its activity in the area and in the long term with its 
results for the motives. 
In Chapter 4: the aftermath of the expedition is presented and the problems with a lack 
of funding for the working up of the research material appear. The ambitious future of the NPI 
was long gone, and the fruitful cooperation turned into a diplomatic affair between Britain and 
Norway in a dispute over monetary settlement. The scientific value was no longer a priority to 
the political motives, but still important to the researchers. Several of them achieved academic 
degrees with the results from the scientific work undertaken on the expedition. A few years 
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later the planned IGY, again, sparked the need for political engagement through scientific work. 
Money was allotted to finish the topographic work and yet another expedition was planned for 
the Antarctic. Thus, throughout the turbulence following the expedition, the projected public 
image of harmony consisted, the scientific focus remained, and its legacy was constructed. 
Chapter 5: presents the chain of motives and links different aspects of the expedition 
linked to them. The expedition had several motives prompting the scientific work undertaken 
and ensuring the execution of the venture. It shows that the motives are closely connected. The 
Basic research motive and the Political motive acted as the source; the other motives derived 
from these. Changes in the geopolitical situation impacted the expedition and the after-work, 
causing fluctuations in the different motives. By pointing out the different motives and showing 
connections to external factors this thesis gives a more nuanced picture to the perception of the 
expedition. 
 
Let us now return to the hypothesis posed in 1.1, which I will divide it into four parts when 
answering. The first part stated that the scientific motives were the driving forces in the 
realisation of the expedition. As addressed in 2.2, the idea for the expedition originated from 
Hans Wilhelmsson Ahlmann. His field studies of glaciers in the Nordic uncovered glacial 
retraction and reports from other studies indicated the same happening in Africa and South 
America. During the Second World War, he laid the plans for an expedition to Antarctica to 
extend his glaciological work and find proof for his theory that the climate changes were a 
global phenomenon. Driven by his search for knowledge, Ahlmann laid the foundations for 
such a venture, building an extensive network and relying on international cooperation for the 
execution. As further discussed in 5.1 the conception of the idea for an expedition was rooted 
in the Basic Research motive, and in the trade-off between science and politics. Further 
planning involved the Political and Military motives for the practical realisation of the 
expedition.  
The second part of the hypothesis stated that the large, and unrealised economic potential of 
Antarctica resulted in the presence of political interests. As shown in 2.1, the Political motive 
was already present before the realisation of the expedition, due to existing commercial interests 
and competition for hunting grounds and the expanding search for marine resources. But in the 
planning of the NBSX a new vision of mineral resources appeared. These unrealised potential 
resources were highlighted, and hyped up, by the media, but stood in contrast to the official 
branding of the expedition. The excessive media representation led to the organisers to 
denounce any plans of exploring for such. Instead, the novelty of an international expedition, 
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aiming at answering global climate questions was put in the spotlight. Still it can be argued that 
the political involvement regarding the strengthening of sovereignty was a part of a 
precautionary policy to secure the jurisdictional functions in case of future possibilities. 
The third part of the hypothesis states that the escalation of the geopolitical situation in the 
Arctic and Antarctic forced politically and militarily motivated actions from all three 
participating countries in order to secure territorial interests. Already during the Second World 
War there had been military operations in the Antarctic. With the onset of the Cold War in the 
post-war era, the Antarctic situation escalated to an arena of security concerns as mentioned in 
2.1. Disputes over sovereignty, and the involvement from non-claimant countries also 
contributed to the strained situation. The future govern of Antarctica was uncertain and different 
ideas of global administration had been presented. This forced a political engagement, which is 
further discussed in 4.3. It was important to secure territorial interests and a possible say for 
any of the participating countries in the future. In utilizing the NBSX and its scientific 
programme, Norway (and Britain) could mark their national presence, as a political trade-off 
with science, and securing territorial claims. As presented in 3.3, the internationalism of the 
expedition also made it possible for military observers from all three countries (including the 
Dominions) to join a "civilian" ship, collect data, experiment and test equipment on a more 
"neutral" ground, than in the tense circumstances around the Arctic. The training of personnel 
and testing of equipment was key in a potential escalation of the situation in the Arctic. And it 
was a possibility for Sweden to reach out to the western allies, without the apparent cooperation 
eliciting Soviet reaction. 
The final statement presents that during and after the expedition the political interest was 
waning, and that the high costs of the operation did not make up for the potential gain from the 
scientific results, presence or the cooperation between the countries. As discussed in Chapter 
4:, the reverberations in the geopolitical situation in the Arctic caught up with the expedition. 
As the costs increased, the circumstances were wearing on the political motivation and on the 
administrative apparatus. At the expedition’s return, the envisaged ambitious future of the NPI 
was curtailed, with minimum funding and focus on the continuation of operations in Svalbard 
and Northeast-Greenland. The previously expected demand for an expansive presence and 
activity in the Antarctic was no longer needed, as the NBSX had accomplished to (at least 
temporary) secure national interests with its presence in the Antarctic. In the aftermath of the 
expedition, the disputes over settlement and the continuous requests for funding for the working 
up of the massive amount of scientific results, put restraints on the aspiring cooperation between 
the countries. The administration had proved costly and cumbersome, adding to the difficulties 
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in the wake of the expedition. The lack of government funding was a reflection of both the 
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Members of the expedition: 
• John Giaever (49), Norwegian, leader of the wintering party 
• Valter Schytt (30), Swedish, chief glaciologist, second-in-command 
• Gordon de Quetteville Robin (27), Australian, geophysicist, third-in-command 
• Nils Jørgen Schumacher (30), Norwegian, chief meteorologist 
• Gösta Liljequist (35), Swedish, assistant meteorologist 
• Ernest Frederick Roots (26), Canadian, chief geologist 
• Alan Reece (27), British, assistant geologist 
• Charles Swithinbank (22), British, assistant glaciologist 
• Nils Roer (34), Norwegian, topographic surveyor 
• Ove Wilson (28), Swedish, medical officer 
• Bertil Ekström (29), Swedish, mechanical engineer 
• Egil Rogstad (41), Norwegian, radio operator 
• Peter Melleby (33), Norwegian, in charge of dogs 
• John Snarby (28), Norwegian, cook (replaced Schølberg Nilsen) 
• Leslie Quar, (27), British, radio mechanic (hired when the wintering party were put 
ashore) 
Additional members 2nd season: 
• Stig Hallgren, (26), Swedish, photographer and handy-man 
• John Jelbart, (24), Australian, physicist and AU observer  
• Bjarne Lorentzen, (51), Norwegian, cook (replaced John Snarby) 
Ekström, Quar, Jelbart and Hallgren were in a weasel accident in February 1951 and only 
Hallgren survived.  
 
